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ABSTRACT
The determination of a death-row inmate's competency 
to be executed is a compelling ethical issue for mental 
health professionals. It has been suggested that forensic 
psychologists who offer such services to the courts may tend 
to approach the problem of determining competency by diverse 
and unstandardized methods (Grisson, 1986). Heilbrun (1986) 
has questioned the effect of the psychologist's potential 
death penalty bias on the outcome of the evaluation 
process.
Death penalty attitudes have a demonstrated effect on 
the decision-making processes of capital jurors who are 
death-qualified, (willing to impose the death penalty under 
some circumstances) or excludable (unwilling to consider the 
death penalty under any circumstances) (Fitzgerald & 
Ellsworth, 1984).
The present study surveyed Ph.D. clinical psychologists 
specializing in forensic services to the courts to determine 
which characteristics associated with the inmate (mitigating 
factors and behavior on death-row) ; the capital crime- 
aggravating factors); or the evaluating psychologist 
(death-qualified or excludable) might be related to the 
final decision of the inmate's competency to be executed.
xii
Results indicated that death-qualified but not 
excludable psychologists were significantly more likely to 
assess an inmate as competent for execution when the inmate 
had committed a premeditated or a heinous crime or when the 
inmate had been diagnosed as a sociopath. The competency 
decisions of the death-qualified psychologists were not 
affected by the presence of any mitigating factors, whereas 
the excludable psychologists appeared more likely than the 
death-qualified to consider mitigating circumstances, 
although the relationship did not achieve statistical 
significance.
The results were interpreted within Wrightsman's (1991) 
assertion that the "first dilemma" between law and 
psychology is belief in the protection of the rights of the 
accused versus protection of society at large. The 
sensitivity of death-qualified psychologists to aggravating 
factors may tend to indicate that they might align 
themselves on the side of protecting society at large while 
the excludable psychologists who are so strongly opposed to 
the death penalty that they would refuse to consider 
imposing it even under extraordinary circumstances of crime 
might tend to align themselves with protection of the rights 
of the accused.
xiii
INTRODUCTION
For approximately a decade, from 1967 to 1976, the 
United States experienced a moratorium on capital 
punishment. When state statutes were revised in 1976 to 
make the death penalty "discretionary, after consideration 
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances" rather than 
mandatory for specified crimes, the United States Supreme 
Court held that such statutes no longer violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment 
(Gregg v. Georgia, 1976). With this intended safeguard in 
place, state after state reenacted death penalty laws that 
were eventually ruled constitutional, resulting in a rapidly 
increasing number of inmates under death sentence across the 
United States (Lewis, Pincus, Feldman, Jackson & Bard,
1986). This number grew by almost 200 during 1984 (Bureau 
of Justice Statistics Bulletin, 1985); totaled 1,714 as of 
May 1, 1986 (Ward, 1986), and the most recent estimate 
indicates that over 1800 men and women currently reside in 
United States prisons awaiting execution (Valeriani, 1987). 
Some of these individuals have lived under sentence of death 
for more than a decade while exhausting legal avenues of 
appeal. It has been widely noted that confinement on death 
row causes extreme physical and psychological stress 
(Gallemore & Panton, 1972; Bluestone & McGahee, 1962). For
1
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example, it is estimated that half of the more than 200 
condemned prisoners in Florida become intermittently 
psychotic (Sherill, 1984). Recently, the states have begun 
to hear pleas that prolonged confinement has rendered many 
inmates incompetent to be executed.
Ford v. Wainright, (1986) affirms the right of the 
condemned to be spared execution while mentally incompetent, 
and validates state laws requiring psychological/ 
psychiatric evaluation and treatment of capital inmates who 
plead that they have become insane while awaiting execution 
(Mossman, 1987). With the rapidly increasing population 
under death sentence, the issue of competency for execution 
is likely to be raised with increasing frequency in the 
coming years. This creates some compelling ethical issues 
for the mental health professions.
The involvement of mental health professionals in the 
death penalty process has sparked a great deal of 
controversy concerning what ethical role, if any, they might 
have in these procedures. Two basic polarized positions 
have emerged (Appelbaum, 1986; Radelet & Barnard, 1986).
The proinvolvement position regards such assessments as 
inevitable; pointing out that capital punishment is 
presently a social and political reality in this country. 
They make the case that assessments should be performed by 
psychiatrists and psychologists who are well-trained, 
experienced, highly skilled, and willing to do a thorough
3
evaluation while maintaining a sharp awareness of the need 
for legally and ethically relevant protection for the 
individual being assessed (Appelbaum, 1986). The 
consequence of abstaining from such evaluations, it is 
argued, is that the evaluations will then be performed by 
those who are less qualified and less likely to do a 
balanced job. In contrast, the anti-involvement position 
holds that involvement by clinicians in such assessments 
places them too close to the administration of punishment 
and threatens to compromise the public's perception of their 
primary treatment role (Radelet & Barnard, 1986). In view 
of the traditional commitment of mental health professionals 
to the practice of healing, some commentators have concluded 
that psychologists and psychiatrists who render such 
services are exceeding the scope of ethical practice. To 
date, however, there is nothing in the formal ethical codes 
of either profession to prevent psychologists and 
psychiatrists from participating in decision-making in this 
life-and death context.
The ethical debate surrounding the execution of an 
insane convicted capital defendant however, has not been 
limited to the medical/mental health professions. Since 
medieval times, the Anglo-American law has forbidden the 
execution of individuals "presenting insane" (Ewing, 1987). 
While the rationale for this ancient rule of law is somewhat 
obscure, the justifications cited by the courts and
4The exclusion of the incompetent from execution is 
based in common law dating back to the 13th century. Among 
the reasons originally cited for this exclusion were: 
a) religious (executing an incompetent prisoner did not 
allow him to put his spiritual affairs in order); b) humane 
(the notion that madness is punishment enough); and 
c) societal (executing the severely disturbed individual 
reflected badly upon society) (Broderick, 1979; Larkin,
1980).
In more recent times, the notion of retribution as 
justification for execution has been impugned where the 
incompetent inmate is concerned, since most states have 
ruled that retribution cannot be fully achieved when a 
convicted criminal is unaware of the elationship between 
his crime and his punishment (Ward, 1986). Additionally, 
the potential inability of the incompetent prisoner to 
provide information to or otherwise assist counsel in 
ongoing appeals has been cited as an exclusionary argument, 
based on the rationale that executions should not occur 
until all possible appeals have been exhausted (Heilbrun,
1987). A "psychological" exclusion has been adopted by many 
states as well, and is based on the argument that 
individuals have the right to progress through the various
commentators for excluding the incompetent from execution
clearly appear to concern ethical issues in a broad context.
Justifications for Competency for Execution
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"stages of death" as described by Kubler-Ross in 1969. When 
the convicted inmate cannot conceptually prepare for death, 
it is argued, the result is an inhumane fear without 
understanding (Heilbrun, 1987). As a result of considering 
the preceding arguments, the United States Supreme Court has 
recently ruled that execution of the incompetent would 
violate the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment (Ford v. Wainwright, 1986).
The Impact of Ford v. Wainwright, (1986)
The procedural problems in determining competency for 
execution have been significant. The United States Supreme 
Court, in Ford v. Wainwright, (1986) ruled that the due 
process protections provided by Florida's procedure for 
determining competency for execution were inadequate.
Alvin Ford was convicted of murder and sentenced to 
death in 1974. Over the course of 8 years on Florida's 
death row, Ford became increasingly more bizarre in his 
ideations and behavior, resulting in his attorney formally 
raising the issue of his competency to be executed in 1983 
(Heilbrun, 1987). The governor appointed the "commission of 
three psychiatrists" that was required under the state 
statute to assess Ford's competency. A joint interview 
one-half hour in length was conducted by the psychiatrists. 
They were provided with a portion of the trial transcript, a 
medical history, and the results of two previous psychiatric 
evaluations. Based on this limited data, two of the three
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examining psychiatrists concluded that Ford was psychotic. 
The third believed that he was "grossly exaggerating his 
symptoms" but concurred that Ford was competent to be 
executed. Three separate reports, one from each examiner, 
regarding the findings and conclusions were submitted to the 
governor, who arbitrarily ruled that Ford was indeed 
competent and set in progress the motion for execution 
without any further evidence. Ford was not granted benefit 
of a hearing to challenge the findings or the basis of the 
governor's conclusion (Heilbrun, 1987). It was this 
procedure that the United States Supreme Court determined 
did not adequately protect the prisoner's right to due 
process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Other 
inadequacies were cited as well, most notably, the nature of 
the mental health assessments and the selection process of 
the examiners who administer them (Heilbrun, 1987).
Regarding the former issue, the nature of mental 
competency exams, clear delineation of the questions 
examiners should be addressing to determine competency was 
not established by Ford v, Wainright. Recently, however, 
some investigators have given to the challenge and Grisso 
(1986) has proposed a model that delineates the following 
questions as essential for clarification if the competency 
process is ever to achieve a standardized format: 1) What 
functional abilities are necessary to be competent for 
execution? 2) What is the situation in which competency
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must be demonstrated, i.e., does the relevant legal task 
involve only the act of execution or should it also include 
assisting counsel in post-sentence appeals? 3) What is the 
nature of the relationship between the observed deficits and 
the client's legal abilities? 4) What is the interaction 
between the client's particular abilities and specific 
demands of the situation? 5) What is the determination by 
the legal decision-maker regarding the person-situation 
incongruence and is it sufficient to warrant a finding of 
incompetence? 6) How will the authorized decision-maker's 
findings impact on the client? The potential utility of 
such a model has directed attention to how the current legal 
standard's among states fit into its' framework. A survey 
of statutes and procedures on competency for execution in 
the 41 states permitting capital punishment revealed that 23 
have statutory proscriptions against executing the 
incompetent, of these 23, two require the inmate 
''understand” , another four have judicially adopted the 
common law proscriptions, i.e., that the inmate "understand 
and assist", four have recently repealed statutes, leaving 
case law supporting the common law rule, and six more have 
general statutes requiring the transfer of mentally ill 
inmates to a mental hospital if they become "insane", 
"incompetent", or "unfit." Two states have a death penalty 
but no law relating to competency for execution, and the 
final two remain "undetermined" (Ward, 1986). Clearly,
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there is little existing consensus between states regarding 
the assessment of competency for execution. While the Ford 
decision did not provide an explicit standard on which 
questions of competency should be based, minimally, it has 
served to stimulate research into the formulation of such 
standards, such as Grisso's (1986) model.
Regardless of the standard used, the competency for 
execution question often falls into the hands of mental 
health professionals. The majority of state procedures 
require that psychiatrists and other mental health experts 
such as physicians and psychologists examine the i* mate and 
make a determination as to competency for execution. These 
procedural codes, however, contain varying degrees of 
specificity regarding the thoroughness of the examination, 
their adversarial character, the independence of the 
evaluators, and whether the findings should be declared in 
writing. In four of the 16 states providing for 
psychiatric/psychological examinations, the examining body 
is the ultimate judge of competence (Ward, 1986). In the 
remaining 12 states, the ultimate decision-maker is the 
court, the governor, the governor and appointed council, or 
a jury (Ward, 1986). In two states the inmate is examined 
by an undefined commission. In three states the inmate is 
evaluated by state hospital officials who make the final 
determination, and the final three states have statutory 
provisions that the court will evaluate and decide the issue
9(Ward, 1986). The past decade has witnessed the growing 
usage of mental health testimony and/or psychological 
evaluations in the courtroom. One recent report, for 
example, estimated that 25,000 evaluations of competency to 
stand trial were conducted by professionals in a single year 
in the United States (Steadman, Monahan, Hartstone, Davis, & 
Robbins, 1982). It seems reasonable to expect that mental 
health examiners will play an ever-increasing role in 
competency issues.
Unfortunately, investigators have yet to respond to the 
latter issue raised by the Ford decision: consideration of 
the selection process and independence of examiners who 
administer such evaluations. Certain empirical questions 
that merit attention have been raised by Heilbrun (1987), 
however. For example, Heilbrun points out that during the 
selection process, professionals who are "defense-oriented" 
may be excluded from consideration. Furthermore, 
professionals who perform competency evaluations may foster 
strong biases either in favor of or against capital 
punishment. The psychological literature is replete with 
studies indicating that death penalty attitudes do not exist 
in a vacuum, but are associated with a whole cluster of 
attitudes, experiences, and knowledge (Cowan, Thompson, & 
Ellsworth, 1984). Such attitudes, it appears, are a symptom 
of a more general cluster of social/political attitudes.
One result of these robust findings has been the
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constitutional guarantee that the sentiments of jurors 
regarding the death penalty shall play a central role in 
determining their competency to serve in capital cases 
(Witherspoon v. Illinois; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984). No 
such guarantees exist, however, that the mental health 
professional rendering expert testimony during trial 
proceedings or evaluating competency for execution will not 
harbor the same attitudes and biases that disqualify jurors 
from sitting in capital cases. A large body of literature 
has been generated to investigate the attitudes and biases 
of potential jurors. Yet, no study to date has attempted to 
measure or generalize these findings to a population with an 
equally substantial, if not greater impact on the outcome of 
capital cases.
Mental health professionals are increasingly being 
asked to provide expert testimony and psychological 
evaluations regarding the existence of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in capital offenses, as well as 
assessing the death-row inmate for competency for execution. 
Judges place a high value on the findings from these 
evaluations (Nicholson, Briggs & Robertson, 1988). Indeed, 
research suggests that the courts rarely disagree with the 
competency recommendations made by members of the mental 
health professions (Reich & Tookey, 1986; Roesch & Golding, 
1978). In view of the emphasis given to mental health 
evaluations in court proceedings and the consequent impact
11
of those decisions on the livers of defendants, there is a 
pressing need for research to identify the relevant 
attitudinal variables which may influence the opinions, 
testimony, evaluations, and subsequent recommendations of 
mental health professionals. Given the absence of 
literature in this area, it may be prudent to extrapolate 
from the body of research developed to examine relevant 
attitudinal variables and biases in potential jurors.
The Impact of Death Penalty Attitudes: Death Qualification
Theoretically and empirically, attitudes of juries 
toward the death penalty have consistently shown powerful 
relationships with other crime control attitudes, and play 
an important role in defining people's ideological 
self-image in regard to their stand on criminal justice 
(Vidmar & Ellsworth, 1974; Ellsworth & Ross, 1983; Smith, 
1976) . These attitudes may influence either or both phases 
of the capital murder trial.
There are two stages in a death penalty proceeding.
The first stage is the determination of guilt or innocence, 
and resembles any other criminal trial (Fitzgerald & 
Ellsworth, 1984). If this process results in the 
defendant's conviction of a potentially capital murder, then 
in most states the jury must deliberate gain, to decide 
between life imprisonment and the death penalty (Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 1976). One consequence of this special
arrangement is that death penalty trials differ from other
12
criminal trials in the questions asked during "voir dire"-- 
the examination of prospective jurors to determine their 
suitability for a particular case. Each member of a capital 
jury experiences, through voir dire questioning the process 
of "death qualification." Death qualification represents an 
extended discussion of penalty at the outset of a criminal 
trial, before any evidence has been presented (Haney, 1984). 
In essence, prospective jurors are asked to reflect upon and 
to predict their own behavior during a possible penalty 
phase of the trial. They are asked specifically whether 
they are so opposed to the death penalty that they cannot 
consider imposing it in any case. Prospective jurors who do 
express such an opinion are dismissed by the court and 
excluded from participation as jurors in that case. Thus, 
jurors who ultimately are seated in a capital case are 
deemed "death-qualified", i.e., willing to consider and 
impose the death penalty under some circumstances. 
Furthermore, they have been repeatedly exposed to the death 
penalty questioning of themselves and others, and typically 
have witnessed the dismissal of several prospective jurors on 
the basis of their death penalty attitudes (Haney, 1984). 
Critics have contended that this procedure creates juries 
that are more likely than ordinary criminal juries to favor 
the prosecution's point of view. Furthermore, they contend, 
these "death-qualified"" juries are unrepresentative of the 
communities from which they are drawn (Fitzgerald &
13
Ellsworth, 1984). Subsequently, the first test-case of 
death-qualified jury bias was presented to the United States 
Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois, (1968).
The Impact of Witherspoon v. Illinois, (1968)
The defendant, Mr. William C. Witherspoon, contended 
that the jury that sentenced him to death had been biased in 
favor of conviction prior to sentencing (Gross, 1984). He 
argued that a juror who is undisturbed by sentencing a man 
to death is the kind of juror who would also tend to ignore 
the defendant's presumption of innocence and accept the 
prosecution's argument and reach a verdict of guilty. 
Witherspoon presented drafts of three unpublished empirical 
studies to support his argument. Each study suggested that 
those who favor the death penalty are more likely to vote 
for conviction during the determination of verdict phase of 
the two-phase capital offense trial. The Supreme Court, 
however, disagreed with Witherspoon’s contention. They 
believed that the evidence presented by the defense was too 
fragmented and tentative to establish a relationship between 
death penalty attitude and conviction-proneness during the 
determination of guilt. Surprisingly, with no specific 
empirical backing, the same court readily concluded that 
Witherspoon's rights had indeed been violated; but in the 
determination of penalty phase. By excluding all opponents 
of the death penalty, they argued, the state had "crossed 
the line of neutrality' and created "a tribunal organized to
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return a verdict of death." The Supreme Court's decision 
did not specifically rule on the constitutionality of the 
death-qualification process; rather it limited its usage.
As a result, a standardized set of questions have emerged 
known as "Witherspoon Criteria" that is commonly employed 
during the voir dire procedure today (Gross, 1984). In 
accordance with the Supreme Court ruling, this criteria is 
designed to eliminate from capital juries only those jurors 
who make it unmistakably clear that; a) they would 
automatically vote against the imposition of capital 
punishment without regard to any evidence that might be 
presented during the trial; and, b) that their attitude 
toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an 
impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt (Gross,
1984). The Witherspoon decision was a landmark case in that 
the Supreme Court suggested that the conviction-proneness of 
death-qualified juries was an open empirical question, 
susceptible to scientific resolution. Moreover, the 
Justices concluded "a defendant convicted by such a jury in 
some future case might still attempt to establish that the 
jury was less than neutral with respect to guilt. If he 
were to succeed in that effort, the question would then 
arise whether the State's interest in submitting the penalty 
issue to a jury capable of imposing capital punishment may 
be vindicated at the excuse of the defendant's intern in 
a completely fair determination of guilt or innocence"
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(Bersoff, 1987). It is very rare for the Supreme Court to 
leave open an issue in this way, and rarer still for the 
Court to issue such an invitation to social scientists to 
develop data to help it in resolving a crucial point of 
constitutional law. Investigators swiftly responded to this 
challenge, and by 1986 a far larger body of data and studies 
on the subject was available. The scientific soundness of 
three decades of social science research that indicated that 
the absence of jurors with moral or religious scruples 
against imposing the death penalty created a jury that was 
pro-prosecution and therefore conviction-prone was at issue 
when the Supreme Court ruled on Lockhart v. McCree, (1986). 
The Impact of Lockhart v. McCree, (1986)
McCree, the defendant in the base, was convicted of 
capital murder in Arkansas in 1978 and sentenced to life 
without parole (Bersoff, 1987). Because the state 
originally sought the death penalty, eight prospective 
jurors were excluded from McCree's jury because they 
revealed that they had scruples preventing them from 
imposing the death penalty under any circumstances. The 
death-qualified jury convicted him, but at the penalty state 
of the trial the prosecution changed its mind and sought 
only the life sentence it obtained. After McCree's 
conviction was affirmed in the Arkansas Supreme Court, he 
sought . it of habeas pus from the federal district 
court. His argument was that social science data now
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provided that the death-qualified jury that convicted him was 
"conviction-prone," in violation of his constitutional 
rights. He called three expert witnesses in his behalf, two 
of whom were psychologists. The district court, and then 
the Court of Appeals, relied extensively on their testimony 
as well as on numerous published studies regarding 
death-qualified juries, many by psychologists. The Court of 
Appeals concluded that "the consistency among all of the 
studies over a wide range of survey methods and respondents 
is impressive" and invited the Supreme Court to review the 
case (Bersoff, 1987). The petition was granted. The 
American Psychological Association (APA), after a strong 
recommendation by its Committee on Legal Issues and 
consultation with social scientists involved in the issues, 
decided to enter the case as a Friend of the Court and 
prepare a brief in which APA would fairly, fully, and 
objectively inform the Court concerning the three decades of 
research on the prosecution-proneness of death-qualified 
juries.
In its brief APA abstracted and critiqued the 
methodology and major empirical findings of the relevant 
research on the conviction proneness of death-qualified 
jurors. Two major arguments were asserted (Bersoff, 1987).
In the first argument, APA stated that the 80C7.nl scic 
data presented by the defendant demonstrated that 
death-qualified juries are more pro-prosecution and
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unrepresentative than typical criminal juries and that 
death-qualification impairs jury functioning. The second 
argument asserted that contrary to criticism, the social 
science data presented satisfied applicable criteria for 
evaluating the soundness of scientific research. It 
rebutted arguments condemning the use of statistical 
significance, provided evidence that the data were not 
limited to simulation studies, answered the claim that the 
data were suspect because researchers had used different 
methodologies to examine their hypotheses, and responded to 
the claim that the positive results were mainly the result 
of experimenter bias. APA concluded that the research in 
question was methodologically sound, reliable, and useful in 
adjudicating the central issues in the case (Bersoff, 1987).
There were two legal issues before the court. The 
first was whether the exclusion during the guilt/innocence 
phase, of jurors, who are adamantly opposed to the death 
penalty but who could be fair and impartial as to guilt in 
the latter phase of the capital trial creates a less-than- 
neutral, prosecution-prone jury. Were this the case, then 
the defendant would be denied due process, in violation of 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The second issue was 
whether the exclusion of these same jurors created a jury 
that was unrepresentative of the community and less than 
properly diverse, violating the Sixth Amendment's 
requirement that juries represent a fair cross-section of
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the community. The Supreme Court refused to hold for the 
defendant on either claim. The Court rejected as "illogical 
and hopelessly impractical" the defendant's claim that 
juries that exclude those who are adamantly opposed to the 
death penalty violate due process because the resulting 
juries are less than neutral with respect to guilt and favor 
the prosecution. An impartial jury, the Court said, 
"consists of nothing more than jurors who will 
conscientiously apply the law and find the facts." The 
defendant had conceded that each of the death-qualified 
jurors that convicted him had met that criteria. Regarding 
the latter claim of a fair cross-section, the Court ruled 
that the Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross-section 
of the community does not preclude exclusion of groups who 
are "defined solely in terms of shared attitude^," Only the 
exclusion of groups defined by immutablt characteristics 
such as race or gender, and thus rejected on grounds 
"completely unrelated to the ability of members of the group 
to serve as jurors in a particular case gives rise to an 
appearance of unfairness" (Bersoff, 1987).
APA was concerned that the Supreme Court would use this 
case as a vehicle for condemning social science evidence in 
judicial decision making. While that did not occur, the 
majority did find "several serious flaws" in the social 
science evidence introduced. Of the 15 studies cited by the 
defendant and relied on by the lower courts, the majority
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found that only six "even purported to measure the potential 
effects on the guilt-innocence determination of the removal 
from the jury of those adamantly opposed to the death 
penalty. "It called eight of the nine remaining studies 
"only marginally relevant" to the constitutional questions 
are issue, because they dealt sclely with "generalized 
attitudes and beliefs about the death penalty and other 
aspects of the criminal justice system." Of the 6 studies 
perceived by the Court as relevant, three had been 
introduced in 1968 in Witherspoon v. Illinois and rejected 
as "too tentative and fragmentary" at that time and, 
according to the Court, remained so. The Court complained 
that the three new studies did not use actual juries 
deliberating in actual capital cases. Finally, the majority 
indicated that only one of the six relevant studies included 
jurors who could not be fair and impartial as to guilt 
because of their adamant opposition to the death penalty, 
calling the rest "fatally flawed" as a result. At the end 
of its critique of the social science data, the Court said, 
"We will assume for purposes of this opinion that the 
studies are both methodologically valid and adequate to 
establish that death-qualification in fact produces juries 
somewhat more conviction-prone than non-death-qualified 
juries. We hold, nonetheless, that the Constitution does 
not prohibit the states from death-qualifying juries in 
capital cases" (Bersoff, 1987).
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Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes: A Review of the 
Literature
Critics believe that the death-qualification process 
creates juries that are more likely than ordinary criminal 
juries to favor the prosecution. Fitzgerald and Ellsworth 
tested this hypothesis in 1984. A survey was administered 
to persons eligible for jury duty in Alameda County, 
California. The respondents were contacted by phone using 
random digit ceiling. An interview was then conducted on 
these respondents for the purpose of achieving a reliable 
estimate of the size of the group whose opposition to the 
death penalty would exclude them from capital juries under 
Witherspoon Criteria, and to assess the effects of their 
exclusion on the attitudes and demographic characteristics 
of prospective jurors at the start of a capital trial. 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that Witherspoon- 
excludable jurors would be more likely to support due- 
process values, while "death-qualified" jurors would be more 
likely to emphasize crime control values. Due process 
values emphasize the fallibility of the criminal justice 
system in apprehending, trying, and convicting lawbreakers. 
Due-process also emphasizes the rights of the accused 
individual and stresses the fact that a defendant is 
innocent until proven guilty. Those who adhere to crime 
control values, on the other hand, believe that the most 
important function of the criminal justice system is
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repressing crime. They believe that laws require strict 
enforcement, and that the criminal system should deal 
swiftly and efficiently with large numbers of criminal 
suspects. They contend that the effectiveness of the system 
hinges on the efficiency of the police and prosecutors. To 
them, the presumption of innocence is seen as an obstacle to 
the punishment of those assumed to be guilty (Fitzgerald & 
Ellsworth, 1984). Furthermore, these authors speculated 
that excludable jurors would have less punitive attitudes 
than "death-qualified" jurors, and that they would be more 
open to certain criminal defenses.
To classify the respondents in the study as 
death-qualified or excludable, three questions were used to 
determine attitude toward the death penalty and Witherspoon 
eligibility. the first question asked respondents to rank 
themselves on a four-point continuum, from strongly opposed 
to strongly favoring the death penalty. The next question 
required the respondents to assume that they had been called 
as possible jurors for a case in which the prosecution was 
asking for the death sentence. A question was also asked 
which would indicate which respondents would be classified 
as disqualified because they could not be fair and impartial 
in deciding guilt because of his/her attitude toward the 
death penalty. These jurors are known as "nullifiers" and 
were eliminated from the sample before the death-qualified 
and excludable jurors were compared. Thus, the survey
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consisted of an examination of the population of jurors who 
could make up their minds about the guilt of a defendant in 
a fair and impartial manner. Within this population, jurors 
who would be willing to consider imposing the death penalty 
were compared to those who would not.
Likert-format items were designed to measure due 
process and crime control beliefs by testing specific 
attitudes toward the right to protection from 
self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence, the burden 
of proof, the exclusion of inadmissible evidence, and 
prejudicial pretrial publicity. Measures were also obtained 
to indicate the respondent's punitiveness, willingness to 
consider the insanity defense, and feelings about the 
opposing counsel.
Demographic data was also collected, in order to 
determine whether or not death qualification 
disproportionately eliminates minorities and other distinct 
groups from capital cases.
Results indicated that 17.2% of the total 717 fair and 
impartial jurors were considered excludable under 
Witherspoon. Furthermore, the excludable respondents were 
more likely that the death-qualified respondents to agree 
that it is better for society to let some guilty defendants 
go free than to risk convicting an innocent person. Death- 
qualified respondents were more punitive than excludable 
respondents and were more likely to favor harsh punishment
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in reducing crime. The death-qualified were also more 
likely to believe in strict enforcement of all laws, no 
matter what the consequences.
Based on other survey questions, death-qualified 
respondents were significantly more likely to trust district 
attorneys and to distrust defense attorneys than were the 
excludable respondents. On the question of insanity; death- 
qualified subjects consistently reported that it was a 
loophole designed to allow the guilty to go free.
Demographic data revealed that blacks were more likely 
to be excluded under Witherspoon than were any other racial 
group. Women were excluded more often than men, and both 
the less educated and the well educated were excluded more 
often than respondents having some high school education or 
a high school diploma.
While Fitzgerald and Ellsworth's 1984 study indicated 
that jury attitudes have the potential to predict verdicts 
in capital cases, the mystery of why this was true was not 
unraveled. Consequently, Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth and 
Harrington (1984) designed two investigations to further 
examine the phenomenon. Initially, they hypothesized that 
jurors who favor the death penalty may tend to interpret 
evidence in a way more favorable to the prosecution than do 
jurors who oppose the death penalty.
Subjects were drawn from a pool of individuals who were 
eligible for jury service in the state of California and who
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also had participated and been determined death-qualified or 
excludable in a previous study conducted by Cowan, Thompson 
and Ellsworth (1984). A video tape of a simulated trial was 
created that showed a prosecution witness and a defense 
witness giving contradictory accounts of the same incident. 
After watching the tape, subjects completed a 16-item 
self-administered questionnaire which included four types of 
questions. Questions 1 through 3 measured the subject's 
perception of the credibility and truthfulness of the two 
witnesses. Questions 4 through 9 asked which witnesses' 
story was most plausible with respect to specific facts 
about which there was conflicting testimony. Questions 10 
through 13 asked subjects about what inferences they had 
drawn about events leading to the trial that occurred in the 
tape. Questions 14 through 16 asked about subject's 
attributions regarding the character and personality of the 
two witnesses in the tape. Subjects indicated their 
responses on a 6-point Likert-type scale.
Results indicated that the death-qualified subjects 
evaluated the evidence in a way more favorable to the 
prosecution than did the excludable subjects. Death- 
qualified subjects were significantly more favorable to the 
prosecution witness on two of the three questions dealing 
with the credibility of the witness, two of six questions 
about the plausibility of specific factors, all four 
questions regarding inferences drawn from facts, and two of
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three questions regarding attributions about the witnesses.
The second phase of the study tested the hypothesis 
that death-qualified jurors have a lower threshold of 
conviction. This was based on a theoretical model of 
decision making by jurors which assumes that a juror's 
threshold of conviction is related to the amount of regret 
he or she associates with erroneous convictions and 
erroneous acquittals. The model assumed that the greater 
the regret associated with erroneous convictions, relative 
to erroneous acquittals, the higher the threshold of 
conviction. Subjects who had participated in study one also 
participated in study two.
The "Regret Scale" questionnaire asked subjects to 
indicate how much regret they would feel in 16 hypothetical 
situations. The scale was numbered from 0 to 100, 0 
indicating no regret and 100 indicating the most regret. In 
each of the 16 situations, the subjects were asked to 
imagine their jury had reached one of four verdicts in a 
homicide case (guilty of first degree murder, guilty of 
second degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, or not guilty) 
and that the defendant was later proven actually to have 
been guilty of one of three levels of homicide or not 
guilty. Among the 16 situations there were four correct 
verdicts, where the jury convicted the defendant of the 
crime he actually committed and 12 errors. Six of the 
errors were on the side of leniency (acquittal or conviction
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of a guilty defendant of a lower-level crime than he had 
actually committed). Six of the errors were on the harsher 
side (defendant was innocent but found guilty, or was 
convicted of a higher offense than was actually committed).
Results indicated that excludable jurors expressed more 
regret when a mistake was made which resulted in a harsher 
decision than did the death-qualified jurors. Additionally, 
excludable jurors showed less regret when an error was made 
which resulted in a more lenient decision than did those 
jurors classified as death-qualified.
The preceding studies tend to indicate that generally, 
death-qualified jurors tend to hold crime-control rather 
than due-process values, and thus believe in a system of 
justice that convicts large numbers of criminals without 
regard to the legitimacy of the insanity defense (Fitzgerald 
& Ellsworth). Furthermore, the studies suggests that one 
reason for this propensity lies in the way death-qualified 
jurors evaluate and respond to the presentation of evidence 
(Thompson, et al., 1984). It is during the penalty phase of 
a capital trial that such evidence is presented and 
considered, and it is often the role of the mental health 
professional to provide expert testimony and psychological 
evaluations regarding these aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. Therefore, it seems plausible that the 
existing literature examining death penalty attitudes and 
juror's responses to aggravating and mitigating circumstances
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in capital trials has a bearing on attitudinal biases 
professionals may hold which could conceivably influence 
their testimony.
Death Qualification and Juror's Responses to Aggravating and 
Mitigating Circumstances
In the penalty phase of a capital trial, the jury hears 
evidence regarding aggravating circumstances that make a 
particular murder even worse than the "typical" first degree 
murder. Evidence pertaining to mitigating circumstances is 
presented as well, i.e., factors that could be seen as 
lessening the responsibility of the defendant.
Luginbuhl and Middendorf (1988) tested the hypothesis 
that death-qualified individuals would be more influenced by 
aggravating circumstances, while excludable jurors would be 
more influenced by mitigating circumstances. Two studies 
were conducted; the first consisted of 157 males and 168 
females who had been called for jury duty in the Superior 
Court of Wake County, North Carolina. The subjects were 
first asked to express agreement or disagreement with one of 
four positions concerning the death penalty, assuming that 
the defendant had already been convicted of first degree 
murder. The positions were as follows: 1) the juror would 
never consider the death penalty under any circumstances;
2) the juror was opposed to the death penalty but would 
consider it under some circumstances; 3) the juror favored 
the death penalty, but would consider not imposing it under
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some circumstances; and finally, 4) the juror would always 
impose the death penalty for first degree murder.
Twenty items were used for testing the hypothesis. Ten 
aggravating and ten mitigating circumstances were taken from 
the North Carolina Criminal Procedures Act (15a-200), and 
reworded into a six-point Likert format with responses 
ranging from strong agreement to strong disagreement. The 
circumstances employed were the ten most often used 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Examples of 
aggravating circumstances were: "It is worse to kill 
someone for money than it is to kill someone out of anger or 
passion"; and, "The sentence should be greater for someone 
with a long record." Examples of mitigating circumstances 
were: "It would be reasonable to give a person a lighter
sentence if he or she committed murder under the influence 
of mental or emotional stress"; and, "We probably should not 
treat a 13-year-old boy who intentionally kills someone the 
same as we would an adult."
The result revealed significant sex, race, age, and 
education effects on attitude toward the death penalty. 
Females were significantly more opposed to the death penalty 
than were males. Blacks opposed the death penalty more than 
whites, and subjects under the age of 45 were significantly 
more opposed to the death penalty than those over the age of 
45. Subjects with post-college education were significantly 
less in favor of the death penalty than those with less than
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a high school education. The results also indicated a 
strong relationship between level of belief in the death 
penalty and acceptance of mitigating circumstances, but no 
relationship between level of belief in the death penalty 
and acceptance of aggravating circumstances.
The second study was a replication of the first. 
Subjects were 151 male and 166 female jurors serving on jury 
duty. The materials were identical to those in study one, 
except for the addition of a death-qualification procedure 
adopted, with minor changes from the official Witherspoon 
Criteria.
With respect to aggravating circumstances, results 
indicated a significant difference between death-qualified 
and excludable jurors over all aggravating circumstances. 
There was not, however, a significant overall difference 
between death-qualified and excludable jurors with respect 
to mitigating circumstances. With regard to one specified 
mitigating circumstance, however, excludable jurors did show 
significant agreement as compared to death-qualified jurors. 
The item dealt with the issue of showing leniency to a 
defendant who may have had some type of emotional 
disturbance at the time of the crime, an important factor 
often presented in capital hearings. Excludable jurors were 
significantly more willing to accept emotional disturbance 
as a mitigating circumstance than were the death-qualified 
jurors. Luginbuhl and Middendorf (1988) therefore suggested
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that individuals with a death penalty bias foster differing 
receptivity to evidence supporting aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, than individuals who are 
fundamentally opposed to the. death penalty. The death- 
qualified individual appears to be oriented toward accepting 
the idea of aggravating circumstances and rejecting the idea 
of mitigating circumstances.
The mounting of a mental illness defense is a 
frequently employed mitigating circumstance, and the mental 
health professional plays an integral role in this process. 
The professional providing expert testimony and 
psychological evaluations appears to have a powerful 
influence in insanity acquittals (Boehnert, 1985). Research 
demonstrating the correlates of insanity acquittals reveals 
that the professional's recommendation appears to be the 
single most important factor (Baunach, 1983). If a 
clinician recommends a finding of insanity, a defendant has 
about an 80% chance of either being adjudicated "not guilty 
by reason of insanit\r" or having his case dismissed 
(Steadman, Keitner, Braff & Arvanities, 1983). In contrast, 
when a professional recommends against a finding of 
insanity, a defendant has only a 1% to 2% chance of such 
adjudication or dismissal (Howard & Clark, 1985). 
Death-Qualification and the Insanity Defense
Based on Fitzgerald and Ellsworth's 1984 findings 
previously reviewed suggesting that death-qualified
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individuals regard the insanity defense as a loophole 
allowing too many guilty people to go free, Ellsworth,
Bukaty, Cowan, and Thompson (1984) conducted a study to 
further examine the tendency of death-qualified and 
excludable jurors to vote for conviction in cases in which 
the defendant's sanity was the major defense. Furthermore, 
these authors wished to determine whether or not the origin 
of the insanity would be considered by the subjects. Would 
organically based mental illness be viewed as more 
legitimate than a mental illness with a purely psychological 
basis? It was hypothesized that the death-qualified jurors 
would be less likely to accept an insanity defense than 
would the excludable jurors.
Thirty-three adults eligible for jury duty in 
California participated. They were determined death- 
qualified or excludable based on Witherspoon Criteria. Each 
subject read four summaries, each one page long of homicide 
cases in which the defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of 
insanity. Order of presentation was randomized. Two of the 
case summaries involved non-organic disorders (acute 
schizophrenia and paranoid schizophrenia) and two of the 
cases involved organic disorders (limited intelligence and 
psychomotor epilepsy). After reading each case, the subject 
answered questions about the applicability of the five 
elements of the American Law Institute (ALI) test of legal 
insanity then in use in California courts: 1) presence of
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substantial mental disease or defect, 2) at the time of the 
crime, 3) causing the crime, due either to 4) the 
defendant's inability to appreciate the criminality 
(wrongfulness) of his/her conduct, or to 5) the defendant's 
inability to control his or her actions well enough to obey 
the law.
Subjects were asked to assume that they were jurors in 
this case, and were to follow the law set forth to them by 
the judge. For three of the cases, the instructions 
required the subject to find the defendant not guilty if he 
or she was legally insane according to the ALI criteria.
In the case of the epileptic, the judge's instructions 
consisted of the legal test of unconsciousness, adapted from 
the Standardized California Judges Instruction Manual. The 
defendant was to be judged not guilty if he or she was 
unconscious at the time of the crime. This would be the 
case if the person's conscious mind was not functioning even 
though the person may appear to be conscious. If evidence 
raised a reasonable doubt about the consciousness of the 
defendant at the time of the crime, then the person should 
be deemed unconscious.
Following the judge's instructions, the subject was to 
reach a verdict of guilty or not guilty. The subject was 
also asked to indicate his or her response on a 40-point 
verdict scale with labels ranging from "Defendant should 
certainly be acquitted" to "Defendant should certainly be
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convicted.” Finally, subjects were asked: a) what 
percentage of the defendants who plead not guilty by reason 
of insanity really were insane, and, b) In general, how 
reliable is psychiatric testimony. Responses were rated on 
a 7-point Likert scale.
Results clearly indicated that subjects who would be 
excluded from jury service were more likely than the death- 
qualified subjects to vote for a verdict of "not guilty by 
reason of insanity" in the two cases involving non-organic 
defendants (acute and paranoid schizophrenics). The 
difference clearly disappeared in the cases in which 
insanity was based on a purely organic disorder (limited 
intelligence and psychomotor epilepsy). There was a 
significant difference between the death-qualified and 
excludable individuals in response to the question asking: 
What percentage of defendants who plead guilty by reason of 
insanity really are insane? Subjects who were excludable 
estimated that on the average, 55% are "really" insane, 
while death-qualified individuals estimated that 30% met 
that criteria.
In a number of states, a convicted capital defendant 
may not be sentenced to death unless the state proves to a 
jury that the defendant is "dangerous", i.e., likely to 
commit further acts of criminal violence, thereby posing a 
risk to the community in the long run (Warrell, 1987). 
Typically, such proof has been presented in the form of
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written evaluations or expert psychiatric/psychological 
testimony that the convicted defendant is in fact, 
dangerous--a practice the United States Supreme Court has 
held to be constitutional (Ewing, 1987). This raises the 
issue of which defendant characteristics or crime 
characteristics the mental health professional may believe 
indicates dangerousness on the part of the defendant, and 
contributes to the professional's willingness to conclude 
that the defendant should indeed be considered for the death 
penalty, if convicted. Although the literature is scant 
concerning this issue, two studies suggest that heinousness 
of the crime and impulsivity on the part of the perpetrator 
may contribute to the perception of dangerousness.
Hester and Smith (1973) studied the effects of a 
mandatory death penalty on the decisions of simulated jurors 
as a function of heinousness of the crime. Differences 
between death-qualified and excludable jurors were not 
assessed in this case. The subjects were 70 male and 81 
female students enrolled in afternoon and evening classes at 
a community college in Seattle, Washington. A possible 
confound in this study existed in that the potential jurors 
were not tested according to Witherspoon or any other 
criteria determining eligibility to sit in capital offenses. 
Therefore, it is possible that any number of the students 
would be disqualified from jury duty due to their personal 
death penalty attitudes.
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A 2x2x2 factorial design was employed. The independent 
variables were heinousness of crime, presence of a mandatory 
death sentence, and sex of the simulated juror. Two 
scenarios were generated to allow for control of evidence, 
extraneous information, and characteristics of the 
individuals involved. The heinous condition involved the 
repeated shooting of a child on a school playground. The 
non-heinous condition involved a single gunshot wound to a 
gang member during a gang war. After reading the scenarious 
of the crime and the details of the murder trial (identical 
statements made by the defendants) the subjects were told to 
assume they were members of a jury and were asked to render 
a verdict. Following their verdict, the subjects were asked 
to rate on 5-point scales: a) their degree of confidence in 
their verdict (ranging from "not at all confident" to 
"certain"); b) how potentially dangerous they considered the 
defendant to be (ranging from "not at all" to "extremely 
dangerous"); c) if guilty, how personally responsible they 
consider the defendant to be (ranging from "not at all" to 
"completely responsible") and d) in the imprisonment 
condition, which sentence they would recommend on the 
following scale: (1) not guilty, (2) 20 years, (3) 25 years, 
(4) 30 years, (5) 35 years, and (6) life imprisonment.
Results indicated that subjects in the mandatory death 
penalty condition rendered an overall rate of 30% guilty 
verdicts compared with 50% in the imprisonment condition.
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Within the gang war murder condition, the imprisonment 
condition resulted in 48% guilty verdicts compared with 20% 
in the death penalty condition. Within the heinous murder 
condition, the imprisonment condition had a 50% conviction 
rate as compared with 39% guilty verdicts in the 
death-penalty condition. This difference was not 
significant. The only sex difference found was in the gang 
war imprisonment condition. The females' conviction rate 
was 30% compared with a 73% rate by the males. A post 
verdict questionnaire revealed that men were more confident 
of their verdicts. A separate 2x2x2 analysis of variance 
was computed on the questionnaires of only those who had 
judged the defendant guilty. The results showed that 
subjects perceived the defendant in the heinous murder to be 
significantly more dangerous to society than the defendant 
in the gang-war murder condition. These results support the 
contention that in the case of a truly heinous crime, 
feelings of outrage and anger toward the defendant, as well 
as the perception of him as being highly dangerous to 
society attenuates strong biases of opposition to the death 
penalty among potential jurors. Thus, heinousness of the 
crime may be one variable that tends to influence the 
perceptions of dangerousness among mental health 
professionals. At least this contention has some intuitive, 
if little empirical support.
Paradoxically, numerous studies published over the past
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half century have consistently reported that violent 
criminals were better--not worse--parole risks than were 
nonviolent criminals (Heilbrun, Heilbrun & Heilbrun, 1978). 
Furthermore, one study found that the rated impulsivity 
index of the crime was a positive predictor of parole 
success (Heilbrun, Knopf, & Bruner, 1973). In fact, Stanton 
(1969), actually identified the impulsive nature of the 
violence involved as the theoretical basis for explaining 
why murderers were especially good parole risks. He 
concluded that their criminal acts were motivated by 
momentary passion, aroused under extraordinary conditions, 
and the loss of control involved in the murder was an 
exceptional circumstance unlikely to be repeated. One 
aspect of the methodology common to all of these parole 
outcome studies, however, has been the use of a limited time 
frame within which parole outcome was determined. While the 
tracking period ranged from 6 months to several years, in no 
study were all parolees followed until the outcome was 
confirmed by discharge (success) or a return to prison 
because of criminal recidivism (failure). Heilbrun, 
Heilbrun, & Heilbrun (1978) designed a study to rectify this 
methodological flaw and to investigate more directly the 
relationship between criminal impulsivity, and parole risk. 
Several predictions were made based upon prior theoretical 
proposals and empirical evidence relating deficits in 
self-control to violence and parole failure, among them:
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a) criminals committing more impulsive murders while 
represent poorer parole risk than criminals committing more 
premeditated murders; b) impulsive murderers will be more 
likely to violate parole by committing another violent crime 
than premeditated murderers.
The records of 164 male criminals were examined with 
each subject meeting three criteria; 1) incarceration in 
the Georgia prison system following conviction for murder,
2) subsequent parole from prison and 3) parole completion, 
either by successful discharge or by termination due to a 
technical violation or commission of a new crime. The 
sample included 58 whites and 106 blacks and represented all 
paroled murderers for whom there were final parole decisions 
in the three year period between 1973 and 1976.
The impulsivity-premeditation variable was measured by 
means of ratings by the two junior investigators from the 
circumstances surrounding the crimes, gathered by the 
arresting authorities at the time of the crime's commission 
and contained within the parole board files. Impulsive 
murder was defined as the killing of another in which the 
thought or instigation to act did not arise prior to the 
immediate commission of the fatal aggression. Premeditated 
murder was defined as the killing of another in which the 
thought and instigation to act had occurred before the 
immediate situation involving the homicide.
The ratings were made along a four-point scale ranging
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from "clearly not planned and clearly a spontaneous act" 
(score = 1) at one end to "clearly planned and clearly not a 
spontaneous act" (score = 4) at the other. The intervening 
points were intended to convey less clear situations in 
which the killings were probably spontaneous (score = 21) , 
or were probably planned (score = 3). The reliability of 
the impulsivity ratings was ascertained by having the judges 
rate 20 of the records in common. The high correlation 
between the 2 independent sets of judgments (r = .94) 
indicates a very satisfactory level of agreement for the 
impulsivity scores.
Success on parole was defined by discharge, whereas 
failure involved return to prison following either technical 
violation of parole or criminal recidivism.
Factor analysis revealed that those who failed on 
parole had committed more impulsive homicides than those who 
subsequently were successful. The predicted relationship 
between prior impulsive violence and parole failure was 
confirmed. Over twice the number of impulsive criminals 
failed on parole than were successful, whereas, almost equal 
numbers of premeditated murders were successful and 
unsuccessful.
To answer the question "Does the impulsivity of the 
prior homicide bear a relationship to the occurrence of 
violent crime?" The impulsivity scores for the violent 
recidivists were compared to those obtained for the
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remaining parole violators. The violent recidivists 
received a mean impulsivity rating of 2.83 compared to a 
mean score of 1.97 for all other parole violators. This 
difference is highly significant: men who broke parole by 
committing another violent crime had more likely performed a 
premeditated act of murder than other parole violators, a 
finding opposite the author's predictions.
The mixed results of this study accentuate the lack of 
precision and uncertainty of predicting "dangerous" in the 
violent offender. Whereas there was a tendency for 
murderers who had failed on parole to have committed more 
impulsive acts of homicide than murderers who were 
successful, murderers who subsequently were arrested for 
another violent crime while on parole had engaged in more 
premeditated acts of homicide than had murderers who 
breached parole by committing a nonviolent crime or by 
technical violation. It appears that at present, the 
question of the relationship between impulsivity and 
dangerousness remains unanswered.
Implications of the Jury Literature for Competency 
Assessments
Ellsworth and her colleagues have developed the main 
body of research on death-qualified juries and the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that her findings appear valid 
(Bersoff, 1987). These findings have repeatedly 
demonstrated that individuals who favor the death penalty
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tend to be more conviction-prone, favor the prosecution, be 
more concerned with crime control than due process, and 
mistrust the insanity defense. Heilbrun (1987) has implied 
that "defense-oriented" and "prosecution-oriented" 
psychologists exist as well and has expressed concern that 
professionals who perform competency for execution 
evaluations may foster strong biases either in favor of or 
against capital punishment. Death penalty biases have also 
been found to influence what has traditionally been 
considered the domain of the psychologist providing expert 
testimony and written evaluations, that is, the willingness 
to accept aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the 
insanity defense.
Empirical studies have frequently relied on measures of 
heinousness and premeditation to present aggravating 
circumstances and measures of impulsivity and pathology 
ranging from "emotional disturbances" to "insanity" to 
represent mitigating circumstances (Luginbuhl & Middendorf,
1988). The results have generally suggested that 
individuals who favor the death penalty are more oriented 
toward accepting the idea of aggravating circumstances (e.g., 
heinousness and premeditation of the crime) as justification 
for executing the defendant and rejecting the idea of 
mitigating circumstances (e.g. , impulsivity and pathology) 
for finding the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity 
(Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988; Ellsworth, et al., 1984).
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Proposal
The precise influence of the perceptions of 
heinousness, premeditation versus impulsiveness of the 
crime, and pathology of the defendant on the willingness to 
accept the insanity defense has not been clearly 
established. Not has the role these factors play in the 
decision-making processes of psychologists been 
systematically investigated. The current body of 
literature, however, in demonstrating relationships between 
death penalty attitudes and willingness to accept or reject 
aggravating (heinousness and premeditation) and mitigating 
(impulsiveness and pathology) circumstances tends to suggest 
that these factors are all interrelated and influential in 
the decisions made by jurors. It seems possible that these 
same variables may be heavily weighted in the decisions of 
psychologists rendering services to the courts, such as 
evaluating death-row inmates for competency for execution.
The present study was designed to investigate 
attitudinal death penalty beliefs held by psychologists and 
examine the variables that may affect their decisions 
regarding the insanity defense and competency for execution. 
To achieve this end, the following research questions were 
addressed:
1. Are the mental health professionals who are 
qualified to perform competency for execution 
evaluations death-qualified according to current
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legal standards, or would they be disqualified 
from jury duty in a capital offense due to death 
penalty bias?
2. Do death penalty attitudes and death-qualification 
affect the decisions of psychologists in 
evaluating competency for execution?
3. How does psychopathology of the defendant affect 
the decisions of psychologists in determining 
competency for execution?
4. Are there interactions among impulsivity, 
heinousness of crime, premeditation, and the 
defendant's known psychopathology with regard to 
the clinicians' decisions regarding competency for
execution?
METHOD
Sub j ects
Ph.D. Clinical Psychologists specializing in forensic 
services were identified from the 1989 National Register of 
Health Service Providers. A total of 2353 psychologists met 
this criteria. Of this number, 1976 (84 percent) were male 
and 376 (16 percent) were female. Based on this wide 
discrepancy in number, and demonstrated sex differences 
pertaining to death penalty attitudes (Luginbuhl & 
Middendorf, 1988), male subjects only were identified and 
then randomly selected using a table of random numbers 
between 1 and 22.
Materials
All subjects received a questionnaire packet with a 
self-addressed, stamped, return envelope. A consent from 
invited participation on a voluntary basis and provided an 
explanation as to the nature of the investigation (See 
Appendix A).
Selected items from the Witherspoon criteria for death- 
qualification developed by Fitzgerald and Ellsworth (1984), 
was included in each packet as part of the questionnaire 
(See Appendix B). Item 1 required subjects to indicate 
their view of the death penalty and was on a scale from 1
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(strongly favor) to 4 (strongly oppose). Item 2 required 
subjects to indicate their willingness to vote to impose the 
death penalty and was on a 2-point scale, with 1 indicating 
an unwillingness to impose the death penalty and 2 
indicating that the subject would be willing to impose the 
death penalty. The third Witherspoon item was omitted from 
the questionnaire due to its potentially inflammatory nature 
and response-biasing effect. It would require subjects to 
indicate whether or not they could remain fair and impartial 
when determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
A brief social history of a capital murder defendant 
with one of the following four diagnoses was included:
a) Paranoid Schizophrenia (See Appendix C); b) Anti-Social 
Personality Disorder (See Appendix D); c) Organic Brain 
Syndrome (See Appendix E), and d) Adjustment Disorder with 
anxious mood (no psychopathology) (See Appendix F). The 
social histories were developed by Deitz and Brown (1990).
To validate each diagnosis, four licensed clinical 
psychologists and one psychiatrist were asked to read each 
social history and attach the most appropriate diagnosis..
A description of the capital crime for which the 
defendant had been incarcerated followed. The descriptions 
were varied from: a) Heinous/Impulsive (See Appendix G);
b) Heinous/Premeditated (See Appendix H); c) Non-heinous/ 
Impulsive (See Appendix I) to d) Non-heinous/Premeditated 
(See Appendix J). The crime descriptions were developed by
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Deitz and Brown (1990).
Finally, the defendant's current behavior on death row 
was described (See Appendix K), including the defendant's 
test scores from the Weschler Adult Intelligence 
Scale-Revised (WAIS-R) and the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI). While the current behavior 
remained the same for all four death-row inmates, their 
WAIS-R and MMPI test scores were varied according to the 
defendant's diagnosis; a) paranoid schizophrenia (See 
Appendix L); b) antisocial personality disorder (See 
Appendix M); c) organic brain syndrome (See Appendix N); and 
d) adjustment disorder with anxious mood (See Appendix 0). 
The test scores were developed by Deitz (1990) and were 
designed according to examples of "typical" scores found 
among individuals with the same diagnoses listed above 
(Greene, 1980).
A questionnaire was developed by Deitz and Brown (1990) 
consisting of 11 items which were designed to answer the 
proposed research questions (See Appendix P). The subjects 
were asked to respond to each item based on the conclusions 
they had drawn from the defendant's social history, crime 
description, current death row behavior, and test scores 
(WAIS-R and MMPI). Item 1 required the subjects to rate how 
heinous they felt the defendant's crime had been on a 
7-point Likert scale. One indicated not heinous at all and 
7 indicated extremely heinous. Item 2 asked the subjects to
respond to know impulsive they believed the defendant's 
behavior had been during the commission of the crime. On a 
7-point Likert scale, 1 indicated not at all impulsive and 7 
indicated extremely impulsive. Item 3 requested the 
subjects to rate how much impact they believed the 
defendant's prior diagnosis had on the defendant's 
commission of the crime in question. On a 7-point Likert 
scale, 1 indicated no impact and 7 indicated extreme amount 
of impact. Item 4 asked the subject to assess the 
defendant's legal responsibility for his actions during the 
commission of the crime. A 7-point Likert scale was 
provided with 1 indicating not legally responsible and 7 
indicating legally responsible. Item 5 requested the 
subject to rate how likely he felt it was that the 
defendant' death row behavior was malingering. On a 
7-point Likert scale, 1 indicated not at all likely and 7 
indicated very likely. Item 6 required the subject to 
determine whether or not the defendant was competent to be 
executed, based on the information provided. Competent was 
defined as awareness of the impending execution and the 
reasons for it (Ford v. Wainright, 1986). A yes or no 
response was required. Item 7 asked the subject to rank 
order the following information sources according to ;he 
effect it had on his judgement regarding competency of the 
prisoner for execution: a) social history, b) crime
description, c) current behavior on death row, and d) WAIS-R
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and MMPI test scores. A ranking of 1 indicated the source 
of information was not at all important to his decision 
while a ranking of 7 indicated that the source of 
information was very important. Item 8 asked the subject 
how many times in the last 5 years he had testified or 
submitted written evaluations regarding the legal competency 
of a defendant. Item 9 asked the subject to indicate with a 
year or no whether or not he had ever been involved in the 
assessment of competency for execution and if "yes", how 
many times. Item 10 was the Witherspoon criteria asking 
subjects to indicate their attitude concerning the death 
penalty. A score of 1 indicated strongly in favor, 2 
indicated somewhat in favor, 3 indicated somewhat opposed 
and 4 indicated strongly opposed. Item 11 was the 
Witherspoon criteria that classifies potential jurors as 
death-qualified or excludable. The subjects were asked 
whether or not they would be unwilling to vote to impose the 
death penalty in any case (classified as excludable) or 
would be willing to consider voting to impose it in some 
cases (classified as death-qualified).
Procedure
A packet was sent to each subject which included the 
following: a) consent form, b) social history of a
death-row inmate; c) crime description of a capital offense; 
d) the inmate's current behavior on death row, including 
WAIS-R and MMPI test scores, and e) a questionnaire designed
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to answer specific research questions. Also included was a 
stamped envelope addressed to the researcher for convenience 
in returning the consent form and questionnaire.
Subjects were invited to participate in the study by 
signing the consent form.
Next, subjects were asked to read the social history, 
crime description, test scores, and current death row 
behavior of a capital felon. Based on this information, 
subjects then were requested to answer a number of 
questions dealing with the prisoner's competency to be 
executed.
Subjects were requested to return the consent form and 
questionnaire. Three weeks after the materials were mailed 
to the subjects, a reminder letter (See Appendix R) was sent 
tn each subject who had not responded. An additional eight 
weeks were allowed for subject response before analyses of
data.
RESULTS
Return Rate and Distribution of Subjects Across Conditions
Eight hundred male Ph.D. clinical psychologists 
specializing in forensic services were randomly selected to 
receive survey material. The material consisted of 
manipulated variables to include 4 conditions of inmate 
pathology: paranoid schizophrenia, antisocial personality
disorder, organic brain syndrome, and adjustment disorder 
with anxious mood (normal control), and 4 conditions of 
crime: heinous, non-heinous , impulsive, and premeditated.
Fifty psychologists were randomly assigned to each 
condition.
Three hundred twenty-two of the 800 selected 
psychologists (40%) agreed to participate as subjects and 
returned completed questionnaires. The frequency 
distribution of subjects across conditions is depicted in 
Table 1.
Of those who participated in the paranoid 
schizophrenic condition, 42 subjects were in the heinous 
condition, 36 subjects were in the non-heinous condition, 42 
subjects were in the impulsive condition and 36 subjects 
were in the premeditated condition.
Of those who participated in the antisocial personality
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Frequency Distribution
Table 1
Impulsive Premeditated Heinous Non-Heinous
Paranoid
Schizophrenic 42 36 42 36
Antisocial
Personality 39 42 37 44
Organic Brain 39 42 46 35
Normal 39 43 40 42
Total 159
49. 4%
163
50.6%
165 
51.2%
157"
48.8%
disorder condition, 37 subjects were in the heinous 
condition, 44 subjects were in the non-heinous condition, 39 
subjects were in the impulsive condition and 42 subjects 
were in the premeditated condition.
Of those who participated in the organic brain syndrome 
condition, 46 subjects were in the heinous condition, 35 
subjects were in the non-heinous condition, 39 subjects were 
in the impulsive condition and 42 subjects were in the 
premeditated condition.
Of those who participated in the adjustment disorder 
with anxious mood condition (normal condition), 40 subjects 
were in the heinous condition, 42 subjects were in the 
non-heinous condition, 39 subjects were in the impulsive 
condition, and 43 subjects were in the premeditated
condition.
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Fourteen of the 322 subjects (4%) chosen not to respond 
to the survey item requiring the psychologist to rate the 
death-row inmate as competent or incompetent for execution. 
Data obtained from these 14 psychologists were eliminated 
from the sample and subsequent statistical analyses, 
resulting in completed data from a total of 309 
psychologists.
Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency Judgements 
A total of 309 psychologists responded to the 
Witherspoon criterion variable regarding their personal 
attitude toward the death penalty and rated the inmate's 
competency for execution (see Table 2). Of this number 57 
(18%) were "strongly in favor", 114 (37%) were "somewhat in 
favor", 65 (21%) were "somewhat opposed", and 73 (24%) were 
"strongly opposed." Of the 57 psychologists who strongly 
favored the death penalty, 43 (75%) rated the prisoner as 
competent to be executed while 14 (25%) rated him 
incompetent. Eighty-twc (72%) of the 114 psychologists who 
somewhat favored the death penalty rated the prisoner as 
competent for execution and 32 (28%) rated him incompetent. 
Thirty-eight (58%) of the 65 psychologists who were somewhat 
opposed to the death penalty rated the inmate as competent 
to be executed and 27 (42%) rated him incompetent. 
Forty-three (59%) of the 73 psychologists who were strongly 
opposed to the death penalty believed the prisoner was 
competent for execution as opposed to 30 (41%) who found him
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not competent. Chi-square analysis of attitude toward the 
death penalty and whether or not the prisoner was competent 
to be executed was marginally nonsignificant, X2 (3) = 7.34, 
£ - .06. This suggests that the personal attitude of the 
psychologist regarding the death penalty was unrelated to 
his judgement of the prisoner's competency to be executed. 
Table 2
Effeet of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency for Execution
Judgement
JudgeT lent for 
Execution
Strongly
Favor
Death Penalty Attitude 
Somewhat Somewhat 
Favor Oppose
Strongly
Oppose
Competent 43(75%) 82(72%) 38(58%) 43(59%)
Incompetent 14(25%) 32(28%) 27(42%) 30(41%)
Total 57 114 65 73
The results of a One-Way Analyses of Variance, however, 
did reveal that the psychologists who rated the inmate as
competent for execution were significantly more in favor of 
the death penalty than were the psychologists who assessed 
the inmate as incompetent for execution [ F (1, 308) = 6.35, 
£ < .01]. Cell means and standard deviations are presented 
in Table 3.
An additional One-Way Analyses of Variance demonstrated 
that the psychologists who were currently residing in states 
that practice the death penalty were also significantly more 
in favor of the death penalty than were psychologists who
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were currently residing in states that have no death penalty 
at this time [ F (1, 321) = 9.51, £ < .002].
When the responding psychologists were classified as 
death-qutlified or excludable based upon their willingness 
(death-qtalified) or unwillingness (excludable) to impose 
the death penalty, a One-Way Analyses of Variance revealed 
that the death-qualified psychologists were significantly 
more in favor of the death penalty than were the excludable 
psychologists [ F (1, 321) = 226.24, £ < .001].
Table 3
ANOVA Death Penalty Attitudes: Cell Means and Standard 
Deviations
Judgement for
beath Penalty Attitude"1 
Mean (Std. Dev.) df F P
Execution Scores (1,308)
Competent 2.39 (1.03)
Incompetent 2.70 (1.03)
3.A score of "1" indicated strongly favored the death penalty, 
"2" somewhat favored the death penalty, "3" somewhat opposed 
the death penalty, "4” strongly opposed the death penalty.
Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency Judgement;
As Related to Prior Psychopathology
Four separate social histories described the death-row
inmate as suffering from one of four psychopathologies prior
to the commission of the capital offense. These disorders
were: paranoid schizophrenia, antisocial personality
disorder, organic brain s>ndrome, and adjustment disorder
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with anxious mood (normal control).
Four 4x2 Chi-square analyses, one for each history of 
disorder, were conducted to determine if the psychologist's 
attitude toward the death penalty (strongly in favor, 
somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed, and strongly opposed) 
was related to whether or not the prisoner was assessed as 
competent for execution.
Within the prior history of paranoid schizophrenia, 
Chi-square analysis of the psychologists' view of the death 
penalty and the psychologists' rating of whether or not the 
prisoner was competent for execution was nonsignificant, X2 
(3) = 1.80, £ = .61. Frequency distributions for the 4 
partitions are depicted in Table 4. These findings indicate 
that within the group of paranoid schizophrenia, 
psychologists' view of the death penalty was unrelated to 
psychologists' determination of whether or not the prisoner 
was competent for execution.
Table 4
Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency for Execution 
Decisions: As Related to Paranoid Schizophrenia
Death Penalty Attitude
Judgement for Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly 
Execution Favor Favor Oppose Oppose
Competent 7(64%) 13(46%) 10(48%) 6(37 %~5
Incompetent 4(36%) 15(54%) 11(52%) 10(63%)
Total 11 28 21 16
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Within the prior history of antisocial personality 
disorder, Chi-square analysis of the subjects' view of the 
death penalty (see Table 5) and whether or not the prisoner 
was rated competent for execution was nonsignificant, X 2 (3) 
= 6.40, £ < .09. This indicates that within the antisocial 
personality disorder, subjects' view of the death penalty 
was unrelated to subjects' determination of whether or not 
the inmate was competent for execution.
Table 5
Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency for Execution 
Decisions; As Related to Antisocial Personality Disorder
Death Penalty Attitude
Judgement for Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly 
Execution Favor Favor Oppose Oppose
Competent 12(85%) 24(92%) 10(62%) 16(73%)
Incompetent 2(15%) 2(8%) 6(38%) 6(27%)
Total 14 26 16 22
Within the prior history of organic brain syndrome, 
Chi-square analysis of the psychologists' view of the death 
penalty (See Table 6) and whether or not the prisoner was 
judged competent for execution was nonsignificant, X2 (3) = 
4.20 £ - .23. This indicates that within the organic brain 
syndrome disorder, the psychologists' attitude toward the 
death penalty was unrelated to the psychologists' judgement 
as to whether or not the inmate was competent for execution.
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Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency for Execution 
Decisions: As Related to Organic Brain Syndrome
Table 6
Death Penalty Attitude
Judgement for Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
Execution Favor Favor Oppose Oppose
Competent 16(80%) 17(63%) 6(46%) 10(50%)
Incompetent 4(20%) 10(37%) 7(54%) 7(41%)
Total 20 27 13 17
Within the prior history of adjustment disorder 
(normal), Chi-square analysis of the psychologists' view of 
the death penalty (See Table 7) and whether or not the 
prisoner was competent for execution was nonsignificant, X2 
(3) = 4.02, £ = .25. This indicates that within the 
adjustment disorder condition, the death penalty attitude of 
the psychologists was unrelated to whether or not the 
psychologist determined the inmate competent for execution. 
Table 7
Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency for Execution
Decisions: As Related to Adjustment Disorder
Judgement for 
Execution
Death Penalty Attitude 
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat 
Favor Favor Oppose
Strongly
Oppose
Competent 8(67%) 27(84%) 12(80%) "11 '661 % >
Incompetent 4(33%) 5(16%) 3(20%) 7(39%)
Total 12 32 15 18
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Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency Judgement:
As Related to Crime Condition
Four separate crime scenarios described the death row 
inmate's crime as occurring under one of our conditions. 
These conditions were: impulsive, premediated, heinous, or 
non-heinous.
Four 4x2 Chi-square analyses were performed, one for 
each crime condition to determine if the psychologists' view 
of the death penalty (strongly favor, somewhat favor, 
somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose) was related to whether 
or not they assessed the inmate as competent for execution.
Within the impulsive crime condition (See Table 8), 
Chi-square analysis of death penalty attitude and competency 
judgement was nonsignificant, X2 (3) = .44, £ = .93. This 
indicates that for the impulsive crime, the psychologists' 
attitude pertaining to the death penalty and his 
determination as to the competency of the prisoner to be 
executed was unrelated.
Table 8
Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency for Execution
Decisions: As Pv.elated to Impulsive Crime
Judgement for 
Execution
Death Penalty Attitude 
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat 
Favor Favor Oppose
Strongly
Oppose
Competent 27(71%) 36(67%) 16(67%) 23(642)
Incompetent 11(29%) 18(33%) 8(33%) 13(36%)
Total 38 54 24 36
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Within the premediated crime condition (See Table 9), 
Chi-square analysis of the psychologists' death penalty 
attitude and competency judgement was significant, X2 (3) = 
10.72, £ < .01. This indicates that in the case of 
premeditated crime, the psychologists' assessment of whether 
or not the prisoner was competent for execution was affected 
by the psychologists' attitude toward the death penalty.
The psychologists who rated themselves as strongly in favor 
or somewhat in favor of the death penalty were more likely 
to assess the prisoner as competent rather than incompetent 
for execution than were the psychologists who were somewhat 
opposed or strongly opposed to the death penalty.
Table 9
Decisions: As Related to Premeditated Crime
Judgement for 
Execution
Death Penalty Attitude 
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat 
Favor Favor Oppose
Strongly
Oppose
Competent 55(76%) 22(54%) 20(54%)
Incompetent 3(16%) 14(24%) 19(46%) 17(46%)
Total 19 59 41 37
Within the heinous crime condition (See Table 10), Chi- 
square analysis of the psychologists' attitude pertaining to 
the death penalty and their assessment as to whether or not 
the inmate was competent for execution was significant, X2 
(3) = 7.73, £ < .05. This indicates that when the prisoner
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Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency for Execution
Table 10
Decisions: As Related to Heinous Crime
Judgement for 
Execution
Death Penalty Attitude 
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat 
Favor Favor Oppose
Strongly
Oppose
Competent 29(81%) 37(71%) 22(58%) 18(53%)
Incompetent 7(19%) 15(29%) 16(42%) 16(47%)
Total 36 52 38 34
had committed a heinous crime, the attitude of the 
psychologists toward the death penalty affected their 
assessment of the inmate’s competency to be executed. The 
psychologists who rated themselves as strongly in favor or 
somewhat in favor of the death penalty were more likely to 
judge the inmate as competent rather than incompetent 
compared to the psychologists who rated themselves as 
somewhat or strongly opposed to the death penalty.
Within the non-heinous crime condition (See Table 11), 
Table 11
Decisions: As Related to Non-heinous Crime
Judgement for 
Execution
Death Penalty Attitude 
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat 
Favor Favor Oppose
Strongly
Oppose
Competent 14(67%) 44(72%) 16(59%) 18(53%)
Incompetent 7(33%) 17(28%) 11(41%) 14(36%)
Total 21 61 27 39
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Chi-square analysis of the psychologists' attitude regarding 
the death penalty and whether or not the prisoner was 
competent for execution was nonsignificant, X2 (3) = 1.60, £ 
= .65. This indicates that when the inmate's crime was non- 
heinous, the attitude of the psychologist pertaining to the 
death penalty did not affect the psychologists' assessment 
of whether or not the inmate was competent for execution. 
Effect of Death-Qualification on Competency Judgements
A total of 309 psychologists responded to the 
Witherspoon criterion variable regarding their willingness 
or unwillingness to impose the death penalty under any 
circumstances and rated the inmate's competency for 
execution. Of this number, 249 (80%) psychologists 
indicated that they were willing to consider imposing the 
death penalty, and were therefore classified as 
death-qualified according to current legal standards. Sixty 
psychologists (20%) indicated that they would be unwilling 
to impose the death penalty under any circumstances, and 
were therefore classified as excludable under current legal 
standards.
Among the 249 death-qualified psychologists, 173 
respondents (69%) indicated that they believed the death row 
inmate was competent for execution. Seventy-six death- 
qualified psychologists (31%) indicated that they believed 
the prisoner was incompetent for execution.
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Among the 60 excludable psychologists, 33 respondents 
(55%) indicated that they believed the death row inmate was 
competent for execution, whereas 27 (45%) of the excludable 
psychologists believed that 'he inmate was incompetent for 
execution.
Chi-square analysis of death-qualification (willingness 
to impose the death penalty) or excludable (unwilling to 
impose the death penalty) and whether or not the inmate was 
found competent or incompetent for execution was 
significant, X2 (1) = 4.56, £ < 4.56, £ < .03 (see Table 
12). This indicates that death-qualification (i.e., the 
willingness to impose the death penalty under some 
circumstances) was related to the psychologists' decision as 
to competency of the inmate. Specifically, within the group 
of death-qualified psychologists, the prisoner was more 
likely to be assessed as competent rather than incompetent 
for execution when compared to the competency ratings in the 
group of excludable psychologists, i.e., those psychologists 
who would be unwilling to impose the death penalty under any 
circumstances.
Effect of Death-Qualification on Competency Judgement: As 
Related to Prior Psychopathology
Four 2x2 Chi-squares, one for each of the four 
histories of psychopathology (paranoid schizophrenia, 
antisocial personality disorder, organic brain syndrome, and
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Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on 
Competency Decisions
Table 12
Witherspoon Criteria
Judgement for 
Execution
Excludable Death
Qualified
Competent 33(55%) 73(69%)
Incompetent 27(45%) 76(31%)
Total 60 249
adjustment disorder) were conducted to determine if the 
psychologists’ willingness (death-qualified) or 
unwillingness (excludable) to impose the death penalty was 
related to whether or not the psychologists assessed the 
inmate as competent or incompetent for execution.
Within the prior history of paranoid schizophrenia, 16 
excludable psychologists responded. Of this number, 6 (38%) 
rated the prisoner as competent for execution while 10 (62%) 
rated him incompetent. A total of 60 death-qualified 
psychologists responded. Of this number, 30 (50%) rated the 
prisoner as competent for execution and 30 (50%) rated him 
incompetent for execution (see Table 13). Chi-square 
analysis of the psychologists' willingness to impose the 
death penalty and whether or not the prisoner was assessed 
as competent or incompetent for execution was 
nonsignificant, X2 (1) = .79, £ = .37. This indicates that 
when the prisoner was previously diagnosed as paranoid
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Table 13
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on
Competency Decisions: As Related to Paranoid Schizophrenia
Judgement for
Witherspoon Criteria
Excludable Death
Execution Qualified
Competent 6(37%) 30(50%)
Incompetent 10(63%) 30(50%)
Total 16 60
schizophrenic, the psychologists' classification as 
excludable or death-qualified was not related to their 
assessment of competent or incompetent for execution.
Within the prior history of antisocial personality 
disorder, 15 excludable psychologists indicated their 
decisions. Of this number, 9 (60%) rated the inmate as 
competent for execution whereas 6 (40%) rated him 
incompetent. A total of 63 death-qualified psychologists 
indicated their decisions. Of this number, 53 (84%) rated 
the prisoner as competent for execution while 10 (16%) rated 
him incompetent (see Table 14). Chi-square analysis of 
death-qualified or excludable and ratings of competent or 
incompetent was significant, X2 (1) = 4.32, £ < .03. This 
indicates that when the prisoner was previously diagnosed as 
antisocial personality disorder, whether or not the 
psychologist was death-qualified (willing to impose the 
death penalty) or excludable (unwilling to impose the death
65
penalty) was related to the psychologists' determination of 
Table 14
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on
Disorder
Judgement for 
Execution
Witherspoon Criteria
Excludable Death
Qualified
Competent 9'<W) 53(84%)
Incompetent 6(40%) 10(16%)
Total 15 63
whether or not the prisoner was competent or incompetent for 
execu ;ion. The death-qualified psychologists were more 
likely than the excludable psychologists to assess the 
inmate with a previous diagnosis of antisocial personality 
disorder as competent rather than incompetent for execution.
Within the organic brain syndrome condition, a total of 
9 excludable psychologists responded. Of this number, 4 
(44%) rated the inmate as competent for execution and 5 
(56%) rated him incompetent. Sixty-eight death-qualified 
psychologists responded. Of this number, 45 (66%) rated the 
inmate as competent for execution while 23 (34%) rated him 
incompetent (see Table 15). Chi-square analysis of death- 
qualified or excludable and assessment of competency was 
nonsignificant, X 2 (1) = 1.62, £ = .20. This indicates that 
when the prisoner was previously diagnosed as organic brain
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"ypoon Criteria
Judgement for Excluc? Kf ' Death
Execution Qualified
Competent VU^l)------------ S T T W l --------
Incompetent 5(56%) 23(34%)
Total 9 68
syndrome, the classification of death-qualified (willing to 
impose the death penalty) or excludable (unwilling to impose 
the death penalty) was unrelated to the competency judgement 
for execution.
Within the adjustment disorder condition, there were 20 
excludable psychologists. Of this number, 14 (70%) rated 
the inmate as competent for execution and 6 (30%) rated him 
incompetent. There were 57 death-qualified psychologists.
Of this number, 44 (77%) rated the prisoner as competent for 
execution as opposed to 13 (23%) who rated him incompetent 
(see Table 16). Chi-square analysis of death-qualified or 
excludable was nonsignificant, X 2 (1) = .41, £ = .52. This 
indicates that when the prisoner was previously diagnosed 
with adjustment disorder, the classification of 
death-qualified (willing to impose the death penalty) or 
excludable (unwilling to impose the death penalty) was
Table 15
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on
Competency Decisions: As Related to Organic Brain Syndrome
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unrelated to whether or not the inmate was judged as 
competent or incompetent for execution.
Table 16
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on
Competency Decisions: As Related to Adjustment Disorder
Judgement for 
Execution
Witherspoon Criteria
Excludable Death
Qualified
Competent 14(70%) wan)
Incompetent 6(30%) 13(23%)
Total 20 57
Effect of Death-qualification on Competency Judgement: As
Related to Crime Condition
Four 2x2 Chi-squares, one for each crime condition 
(impulsive, premeditated, heinous and non-heinous) were 
conducted to determine if the willingness (death-qualified) 
or unwillingness (excludable) of the psychologists to impose 
the death penalty was related to the psychologists 
assessment of whether or not the inmate was competent or 
incompetent for execution.
Within the impulsive crime condition, 27 excludable 
psychologists responded. Of this number, 17 (63%) rated the 
inmate as competent and 10 (37%) rated him as incompetent 
for execution. A total of 125 psychologists who were death- 
qualified responded. Of this number, 85 (68%) rated the 
prisoner as competent and 40 (32%) rated him incompetent
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(see Table 17). Chi-square analysis of death-qualified or 
excludable and whether or not the inmate was rated as 
competent or incompetent was ronsignificant, X 2 (1) = .07, £ 
= .77. This indicate that when the inmate had committed an 
Table 17
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on 
Competency Decisions: As Related to Impulsive C: me
Judgement for 
Execution
Witherspoon Criteria
Excludable heath
Qualified
Competent 17(63%) 85(68%)
Incompetent 10(37%) 40(32%)
Total 27 125
impulsive crime, whether or not the psychologist was death- 
qualified (willing to impose the death penalty) or 
excludable (unwilling to impose the death penalty) was 
unrelated to whether or not the inmate was rated as 
competent or incompetent for execution.
Within the premeditated crime condition, 33 excludable 
subjects responded. Of this number, 16 (48%) rated the 
inmate as competent for execution while 17 (52%) rated him 
incompetent. A total of 123 death-qualified subjects 
responded. Of this number, 87 (71%) assessed the inmate as 
competent for execution and 36 (29%) assessed him as 
incompetent for execution (see Table 18). Chi-square 
analysis of death-qualified or excludable and competency
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Table 18
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on
Competency Decisions: As Related to Premeditated Crime
Witherspoon Criteria
Judgement for 
Execution
Excludable Death
Qualified
Competent 16(482) 87(712)
Incompetent 17(52%) 36(29%)
Total 33 123
assessment of the inmate was significant, X2 (1) = 5.74, £
< .01. This indicates that whether or not the psychologist 
was death-qualified (willing to impose the death penalty) or 
excludable (unwilling to impose the death penalty) was 
related to whether or not the inmate was assessed as 
competent or incompetent for execution. In the case of 
premeditation in crime, those psychologists who were willing 
to impose the death penalty (death-qualified) were more 
likely than those psychologists who were unwilling to impose 
the death penalty (excludable) to assess the prisoner as 
competent rather than incompetent for execution.
Within the heinous crime condition, there were a total 
of 29 excludable psychologists. Of this number, 15 (52%) 
rated the inmate as competent for execution while 14 (48%) 
rated him incompetent. A total of 131 death-qualified 
psychologists were in this condition. Of this number, 91 
(69%) respondents rated the prisoner as competent and 40 
(31%) respondents rated him incompetent (see Table 19).
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Table 19
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on
Competency Decisions: As Related to Heinous Crime
Judgement for 
Execution
Witherspoon
Excludable
Criteria
Death
Qualified
Competent 15(52%) 91(69%T“
Incompetent 14(48%) 40(31%)
Total 29 131
Chi-square analysis of death-qualified or excludable and 
competent or incompetent was marginally nonsignificant, X2 
(1) = 3.34, £ =  .06. This indicates that when the capital 
crime was heinous, the willingness (death-qualified) or 
unwillingness (excludable) of the psychologist to impose the 
death penalty was unrelated to whether or not the inmate was 
assessed as competent or incompetent for execution.
Within the non-heinous crime condition, of the 31 
excludable psychologists, 18 (58%) rated the prisoner as 
competent for execution and 13 (42%) rated him incompetent. 
Of the 117 death-qualified psychologists, 81 (69%) rated the 
prisoner competent and 36 (31%) rated him incompetent (see 
Table 20). Chi-square analysis was nonsignificant, X2 (1) = 
.92, £ = .33. This indicates that in the non-heinous crime 
condition, willingness to impose the death penalty (death- 
qualified) or the unwillingness to impose the death penalty 
(excludable) was unrelated to whether or not the prisoner
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was assessed as competent or incompetent for execution. 
Table 20
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on 
Competency Decisions: As Related to Non-heinous Crime
Witherspoon Criteria 
Judgement for Excludable Death
Execution Qualified
Competent 18(58%) 81(69%)
Incompetent 13(42%) 36(31%)
Total 31 117
Effect of Type of Disorder on Competency Judgement
One 4 (type of disorder) x 2 (competent or incompetent). 
Chi-square analysis was conducted to determine if the 
prisoner's previous type of psychopathology was related to 
whether or not the psychologists rated the prisoner as 
competent or incompetent for execution independent of 
death-qualified or excludable classification. A 
relationship emerged between these variables (see Table 21). 
Table 21
Effect of Type of Disorder on Competency Decision
_  “  S H I  of DisorderJudgement Paranoid Antisocial Organic Adjustment
for Schizophrenia Personality Brain Disorder
Execution Disorder Syndrome
Competent 36(47%) 62(79%) 50(64%) 58775%)
Incompetent 40(53%) 16(21%) 28(36%) 19(25%)
Total 76 78 78 77
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Mien the prisoner was described as previously diagnosed 
as paranoid schizophrenia, 36 (47%) of the respondents rated 
him as competent for execution and 40 (53%) rated him 
incompetent. In contrast, when the prisoner was previously 
diagnosed as antisocial personality disorder, organic brain 
syndrome, or adjustment disorder, he was rated as competent 
rather than incompetent more often. Specifically, when 
diagnosed as antisocial personality disorder, 62 (79%) of 
the psychologists rated him as competent compared to 16 (21%) 
who rated him as incompetent. In the case or organic brain 
syndrome, 50 (64%) of the psychologists rated him competent 
while 28 (36%) rated him incompetent. When the previous 
diagnosis was adjustment disorder, 58 (75%) of the 
psychologists rated the inmate competent for execution and 
19 (25%) rated him incompetent. Chi-square analysis of the 
prisoners type of prior psychopathology and the 
psychologist's judgement regarding the prisoner's competency 
to be executed was significant, X2 (3) = 21.33, £ < .001.
This indicate that the psychologist's judgement was affected 
by the prisoner's previous clinical condition. Paranoid 
schizophrenia was the only disorder that was more often 
rated not competent rather than competent for execution.
Main Effects of Psychopathology: On Impact of Disorder 
During Crime Commission
A One-Way Analysis of Variance revealed that the 
prisoner's prior type of disorder significantly affected the
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amount of impact the psychologists believed the disorder had 
on the commission of the crime [ F (3, 315) = 10.56, £ < 
.05], Cell means and standard deviations for the dependent 
variables impact of clinical condition, legal 
responsibility, and malingering are presented in Table 22. 
Neuman-Keuls' procedure indicated that the prisoner 
diagnosed an adjustment disorder with anxious mood was rated 
as significantly less affected (p < .05) by his clinical 
condition during the commission of the crime than when the 
diagnosis was paranoid schizophrenia (3.17 vs. 4.61), 
organic brain syndrome (3.17 vs. 4.41), or antisocial 
personality disorder (3.17 vs. 4.28).
On Legal Responsibility for the Crime
Results of a One-Way Analysis of Variance also revealed 
a main effect of type of psychopathology on how legally 
responsible for his crime the inmate was believed to be [ F 
(3, 314) = 18.13, £ < .001], Neuman-Keuls analysis revealed 
that the psychologists rated the prisoner with the previous 
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia as significantly less 
legally responsible (£ < .001) for committing the capital 
offense than they rated the prisoner diagnosed as adjustment 
disorder (4.88 vs. 6.26). The prisoner with paranoid 
schizophrenia was also rated as significantly less legally 
responsible for the crime (£ < .001) than the prisoner with 
antisocial personality disorder (4.88 vs. 6.30). The 
prisoner diagnosed as organic brain syndrome was rated by
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ANOVA Main Effects of Psychopathology
Table 22
oImpact of Clinical Condition
Type of Mean (Std. Dev.) df F P
Disorder__________________Scores_______ (3,315) 10.56, . 001
Paranoid
Schizophrenic 4.61 (1.66)
Antisocial
Personality Disorder 4.18 (1.98)
Organic Brain
Syndrome 4.41 (1.62)
Adjustment Disorder 3.17 (1.70)
Legal Responsibility
Type of Mean (Std. Dev.) df F P
Disorder Scores (3,314) 18.13 .001
Paranoid
Schizophrenic 4.88 (1.91)
Antisocial
Personality Disorder 6.30 (1.14)
Organic Brain
Syndrome 5.29 (1.59)
Adjustment Disorder 6.26 (1.15)
QMalingering Likelihood
Type of Mean (Std. Dev.) df F P
Disorder ______Scores_______ (3,311) 16.11 .001
Paranoid
Schizophrenic 3.24 (1.59)
Antisocial
Personality Disorder 4.80 (1.73)
Organic Brain
Syndrome 3.50 (1.48)
Adjustment Disorder 4.41 (1.67)
aA Score was obtained between "1" and "7"; "l" indicating
"Had No Impact" and "7" indicating "Had Extreme Impact". 
JA Score was obtained between "1" and "7"; "1" indicating 
"Not at All Responsible" and "7" indicating "Completely 
Responsible".CA Score was obtained between "1” and ”7"; "1" indicating 
"Not at All Likely" and "7" indicating "Extremely Likely If
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the psychologists as significantly less legally responsible 
for his crime (£ < .001) than the prisoner with adjustment 
disorder (5.29 vs. 6.26) and those previously affected with 
organic brain syndrome were also rated as less legally 
responsible for their actions during the crime (£ < .001) as 
those previously affected with antisocial personality 
disorder (5.29 vs. 6.30). No other significant differences 
between the four psychopathologies were demonstrated. 
Likelihood of Malingering on Death Row
A main effect of type of disorder emerged by One-Way 
Analysis of Variance on the dependent variable of likelihood 
that the prisoner's current behavior on death row was 
malingering [ F (3, 311) = 16.11, £ < .001]. Neuman-Keuls 
analysis demonstrated that the psychologists rated the 
prisoner previously diagnosed as antisocial personality 
disorder significantly more likely to be malingering on 
death row (£ < .001) than the prisoner formerly diagnosed as 
paranoid schizophrenic (A.80 vs. 3.2A). The subjects also 
believed that the inmate formerly diagnosed as adjustment 
disorder was significantly more likely to be malingering on 
death row (£ < .001) than was the paranoid schizophrenic 
(A.A1 vs. 3.2A). The psychologists rated the prisoner 
previously diagnosed as antisocial personality disorder as 
Mficantly morr 1-<kely to be malingering (£ < .001) than 
the prisoner formerly diagnosed as organic brain syndrome 
(A.80 vs. 3.50) and also believed that the prisoner
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diagnosed as adjustment disorder was significantly more 
likely to be malingering on death row (£ < .001) than was 
the prisoner formerly diagnosed as organic brain syndrome 
(A.41 vs. 3.50). No other significant differences in 
likelihood of malingering occurred between any of the four 
groups.
Main Effects of Type of Crime
Six One-Way Analyses of Variance was conducted to 
investigate the possible effects of type of crime (heinous/ 
non-heinous; impulsive/premeditated) on the dependent 
variables of a) impact of the clinical condition on the 
commission of the crime, b) legal responsibility of the 
inmate for the crime, and c) likelihood that the defendant 
was malingering on death row.
Results indicated that a main effect of heinous crime 
was evident on the dependent variable of impact the clinical 
condition of the inmate had on the inmate's behavior during 
the crime [ F (1, 315) = 4.85, £ < .02]. The analysis 
revealed that the prisoners who had committed a heinous 
crime were rated by the psychologists as significantly more 
affected by their clinical condition (paranoid 
schizophrenia, antisocial personality disorder, organic 
brain syndrome, or adjustment disorder) than those prisoners 
who had committed a non-hemous crime.
An additional One-Way Analysis of Variance demonstrated 
that the crime committed under the premeditated crime
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To assess the validity of the independent variables: 
heinous crime, impulsive crime, and premeditated crime, 
One-Way Analysis of Variance were conducted on the dependent 
measures of: a) perceived heinousness of the crime, 
b) impulsivity rating of the crime, and c) degree of 
premeditation of the crime. Results revealed that the crime 
committed under the heinous crime condition was perceived as 
significantly more heinous than was the crime committed 
under the non-heinous crime condition ( F (1, 321) = 56.20,
£ < .001]. The crime committed under the impulsive crime 
condition was rated as significantly more impulsive than the 
crime committed under the premeditated crime condition [ F 
(1, 315) = 184.74, £ < .001], and the crime committed under 
the premeditated crime condition was rated as significantly 
more premeditated than was the crime committed under the 
impulsive crime condition ( F (1, 315) = 190,67, p < .001], 
No other significant effects were obtained for type of 
crime.
Main Effects of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty
Three One-Way Analyses of Variance were conducted to 
investigate the possible effects of death-qualified (willing 
to impose the death penalty) or excludable (unwilling to 
impose the death penalty) on the dependent measures of
condition was rated as significantly more heinous [ F (1,
321) = A. 15, £ < .04] by the respondents than was the crime
committed under the impulsive crime condition.
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a) impact of the disorder on the commission of the crime,
b) legal responsibility for the crime, and c) likelihood of 
malingering. No significant differences were obtained 
between the two groups of death-qualified or excludable 
psychologists in their ratings of the three dependent 
measures. Additional One-Way Analyses of Variance were 
conducted to determine if differences were apparent between 
the death-qualified and excludable psychologists in their 
ratings of: a) how heinous they perceived the crime to be, 
b) how premeditated they believed the crime was, and c) how 
impulsive they believed the crime had been. No significant 
differences were obtained. The death-qualified and 
excludable psychologists demonstrated statistically 
equivalent mean scores on ratings of heinousne^s, 
premeditation, and impulsivity linger every crime condition. 
Main Effects of Competency: On Impact of the Disorder 
during Crime Commission
One-Way Analysis of Variance revealed that the 
psychologists who assessed the inmate as competent for 
execution rated the inmate as significantly less affected by 
his previous clinical diagnosis than did the psychologists 
who assessed the inmate as incompetent for execution f F (1, 
3 0 6 ) = 2 6 . 0 7 , £ < . 0 0 1 ].
On Legal Responsibility for the Crime
One-Way Analyses of Variance demonstrated that the 
psychologists who assessed the inmate as competent for
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execution rated the prisoner as significantly more legally 
responsible for his crime than the psychologists who 
assessed the inmate as incompetent for execution 
[ F (1, 306) = 67.09, p < .001.
On Likelihood of Malingering Behavior on Death Row
It was also demonstrated by One-Way Analyses of 
Variance that the psychologists who assessed the inmate as 
competent for execution rated the inmate as significantly 
more likely to be malingering on death row than did the 
psychologists who assessed the inmate as incompetent for 
execution [ F (1, 303) = 142.71, £ < .001. Cell means and 
standard deviations for the three dependent measures of 
impact of the disorder on crime, legal responsibility for 
crime, and likelihood of malingering are illustrated in 
Table 23.
Each subject was presented with four different sources 
of information pertaining to the death-row inmate. These 
sources were: a) social history, b) crime description, 
c) current behavior on death-row, and d) test scores (WAIS-R 
and MMPI-1). The psychologists rated each source of 
information according to how much impact it had upon their 
judgement of the inmate's competency to be executed. The 
mean ratinp ~>r the psychologists who judged the inmate to 
be competent for execution and those who judged him to be 
incompetent for execution are presented in Table 24.
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ANOVA Main Effects of Competency
Table 23
Impact of Clinical Condition3
Judgement for 
Execution
Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Scores
df
(1,306)
F
26.07
P
. 001
Competent 4.75 (1.78)
Incompetent 4.83 (1.70)
Legal Responsibility
Judgement for Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Execution Scores
df
(1,306)
F
26.07
P
. 001Competent 6.16 (1.17)
Incompetent 4.71 (1.91)
Malingering Likelihood0
Judgement for 
Execution
Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Scores
df
(1,306)
F
26.07
P
.001
Competent 4.69 (1.58)
Incompetent 2.59 (1.10)
A Score was obtained between "1" and "7"; "1" indicating 
l "Had No Impact" and "7" indicating "Had Extreme Impact".
A Score was obtained between "1" and "7"; "1" indicating 
"Not at All Responsible" and "7" indicating "Completely 
Responsible".
A Score was obtained between "1" and "7"; "1" indicating 
"Not at All Likely" and "7" indicating "Extremely Likely".
On Importance of Social History
The subjects were requested to rate how important the
information contained in the social history of the inmate
was in formulating their assessment as to whether or not the
inmate was competent or incompetent for execution. All
information included in the social history was held constant
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between groups except for the previous diagnoses of the 
inmate, which was varied between paranoid schizophrenic, 
antisocial personality disorder, organic brain syndrome, and 
adjustment disorder with anxious mood.
Table 24
Cell Means and Standard Deviations Denoting the Importance 
of Information Sources on Formulating Competency Decision
Source of Information
Social3
History
Crime3
Description
Current3
Behavior
Test3
Scores
Judgement for 
Execution
Mean
(Std.Dev.)
Mean
(Std.Dev.)
Mean
(Std.Dev.)
Mean
(Std.Dev.)
Competent 5.05 
(1.64)
5.26 
(1.89)
4.74
(1.74)
5.46
(1.54)
Incompetent 4.66
(2.19)
4.05
(2.10)
6.04
(1.29)
4.78
(1.70)
aA Score was obtained between "1" and "7" with "l” indicating 
"Not at All Important","?" indicating "Extremely Important."
One-Way Analyses of Variance indicated that there were
no significant differences between the degree of importance
attributed to information contained in the social history
among the psychologists who rated the inmate competent and
the psychologists who rated him incompetent.
On Importance of Crime Description
All subjects were asked to rate how important they
believed the information contained in the crime description
was in the formulation of their decision as to whether or
not the prisoner was competent for execution.
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A One-Way Analyses of Variance revealed that the 
psychologists who assessed the inmate competent for 
execution rated the crime description significantly more 
important in formulating their decision than did the 
psychologists who rated the inmate incompetent for execution 
[ F (1, 306) = 25.64, £ < .001].
On Importance of Current Behavior on Death Row
The psychologists were requested to rate how important 
the inmate's current behavior on death row was in 
formulating their decision regarding the inmate's competency 
for execution.
A One-Way Analyses of Variance demonstrated that the 
psychologists who rated the inmate competent for execution 
attributed significantly less importance to the behavior the 
inmate was currently demonstrating on death row than did the 
psychologists who rated the inmate incompetent for execution 
( F (1, 309) = 45.28 £ < .001].
On Importance of Test Scores
The subjects were asked to rate how important the 
inmate's psychological test scores (MMPI, WAIS-R) were in 
formulating their decision as to the competency of the 
prisoner to be executed.
One-Way Analysis of Variance revealed that the 
psychologists who assessed the inmate competent for 
execution rated the test scores as significantly more 
important in their decision than did the psychologist who
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determined that the inmate was incompetent for execution ( F 
(1, 305) = 12.41, £ < .001].
The mean impact ratings of the social history, crime 
description, current behavior on death-row, and test scores 
were compared using standard £-tests for the two groups of 
psychologists, i.e., the group of psychologists who assessed 
the inmate as competent for execution and the group that 
assessed the inmate as incompetent for execution. All 
significant effects were observed with a £ < .05. Within 
the group who judged the inmate to be competent, the 
psychologists rated the test scores as significantly more 
important to the formulation of their competency decision 
than the inmate's current behavior on death-row (5.46 vs. 
4.74), t (205) = -4.46. They also rated the crime 
description was significantly more important to the issue of 
competency than the inmate's current death-row behavior 
(5.26 vs. 4.74), £ (205) = 2.92. The inmate’s test scores 
were rated by this group as significantly more important 
than the inmate's social history for the determination of 
competency (5.46 vs. 5.05) t (205) = -2.. 60. No other 
significant differences in the mean importance ratings for 
the four sources of information were determined within the 
group of subjects that judged the inmate to be competent for 
execution.
Within the group of subjects who assessed the inmate 
incompetent to be executed, the psychologists endorsed the
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inmate's current behavior on death-row as significantly more 
important to their determination of incompetency than the 
inmate's test scores (6.04 vs. 4.78), t_ (99) = 5.96. They 
further endorsed the current death-row behavior as 
significantly more important to their decision than the 
inmate's social history (6.04 vs. 4.66), t (99) = -5.47; or 
the description of the crime (6.04 vs. 4.05) t_ (99) = -8.11. 
The inmate's test scores were rated significantly more 
important to the competency decision than the crime 
description (4.78 vs. 4.05), t (99) = -2.68, and the 
inmate's social history was rated as significantly more 
important than the crime description as well (4.66 vs.
4.05), t: = 1,98. No other significant differences were 
illustrated in the mean impact ratings of the sources of 
information within the group of psychologists who judged the 
inmate to be incompetent for execution.
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty
Four One-Way Analyses of Variance were conducted to 
investigate the possible relationships between whether or 
not the psychologist was death-qualified (willing to impose 
the death penalty) or excludable (unwilling to impose the 
death penalty) on the dependent measures of a) importance 
of social history, b) importance of crime description,
c) importance of current behavior on death row, and
d) importance of test scores.
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Results indicated that the death-qualified 
psychologists rated the social history significantly more 
important to their decision regarding competency of the 
inmate than did the excludable psychologists [ F (1, 312) = 
4.74, £ < .03]. There were no significant differences 
between the ratings of the death-qualified or excludable 
psychologists on the importance they attributed to the crime 
description, current behavior on death row, or inmate’s test 
scores (See Table 25).
The mean impact ratings of the social history, crime 
description, current behavior on death-row, and test scores 
were compared using standard t-tests for the two groups of 
psychologists, i.e., the group of psychologists who were 
death-qualified and the group that was excludable. All 
significant effects were observed with a £ < .05. Within 
the group of death-qualified psychologists, the subjects 
rated the inmate's test scores significantly more important 
in the formulation of their competency for execution 
decision than the crime description (5.30 vs. 4.92), t (251) 
= -2.34. The death-qualified psychologists endorsed the 
inmate’s current death-row behavior, social history, and 
crime description as having statistically equivalent value 
to their determination of whether or not the inmate was 
competent to be executed.
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Table 25
Cell Means and Standard Deviations Denoting the Importance
of Information Sources Between Death-Qualified and
Excludable Subjects
Social3
Source of 
Crimea
Information
Current3 Test3
History Description Behavior Scores
Witherspoon Mean Mean Mean Mean
Criteria (Std.Dev.) (Std.Dev.) (Std.Dev.) (Std.Dev.
Death
Qualified 5.03 4.92 5.16 5.30
(1.75) (2.04) (1.69) (1.54)
Excludable 4.46 4.57 5.38 5.00
(2.12) (2.04) (1.81) (1.89)
A Score was obtained between "1" and "7" with "1" 
indicating "Not at All Important" and "7" indicating 
"Extremely Important."
Within the group of excludable psychologists, the 
current death-row behavior of the inmate was rated as
significantly more important to their competency assessment 
than either the crime description (5.38 vs. 4.57), t: (59) = 
-2.33 or the inmate's social history (5.38 vs. 4.46), t_ (59) 
= -2.57. No other significant differences in the mean 
impact ratings of the four measures were observed within the 
group of excludable psychologists. Table 26 presents the 
rank-ordered mean value of the four sources of information
(social history, crime description, current behavior, and 
test scores) as endorsed by the four groups of subjects
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Table 26
Rank-ordered Mean Value of the Information Sources as 
Endorsed by Psychologists Who Determined the Inmate 
Competent or Incompetent and Who Were Death-Qualified or 
Excludable
(determined inmate competent, determined inmate incompetent,
death-qualified, and excludable).
Determined Determined Witherspoon WitherspoonCompetent Incompetent Death-Qualified Excludable
Test Current Test CurrentScores Behavior Scores Behavior(5.46) (6.04) (5.30) (5.38)
Crime Test Current TestDescription Scores Behavior Scores(5.26) (4.78) (5.16) (5.00)
Social Social Social Crime
History History History Description
(5.05) (4.66) (5.03) (4.57)
Current Crime Crime Social
Behavior Description Description History
(4.74) (4.05) (4.92) (4.46)
Effect of Type of Disorder
Four One-Way Analyses of Variance were conducted to 
determine the effects of the type of disorder on the 
dependent variables of a) importance of social history, 
b) importance of crime description, c) importance of current 
behavior on death row, and d) importance of test scores.
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A main effect of type of disorder was found on the 
dependent measure of crime description ( F (3, 312) = 2.87, 
£ < .03]. Neuman-Keuls analysis indicated that when the 
prisoner was described as previously affected by antisocial 
personality disorder the psychologists rated the crime 
description as significantly more important to their 
determination of competency to be executed (£ < .03) 
compared to when the prisoner was described as previously 
affected by paranoid schizophrenia (5.27 vs. 4.34). No 
other significant effects of psychopathology were 
demonstrated.
DISCUSSION
The present study was designed to investigate the 
relationship between death penalty attitudes, death- 
qualification, and aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
on the competency for execution decisions made by forensic 
psychologists. The classification of death-qualified or 
excludable status among subjects was determined by the 
criteria developed by Fitzgerald and Ellsworth in 1984 and 
is the criteria that meets current legal standards for the 
selection of death-qualified jurors to serve on capital 
juries. Those who would consider imposing the death penalty 
under some circumstances are classified as death-qualified 
and eligible to serve as jurors in capital offenses. Those 
who are unwilling to consider imposing the death penalty 
under any circumstances are classified as excludable and are 
ineligible for jury duty in capital trials.
Death-Qualified Versus Excludable Psychologists
The present study found that 258 of the 322 responding 
psychologists (80%) indicated that they would be willing to 
impose the death penalty, and would therefore be considered 
death-qualified under current legal standards. Sixty 
psychologists (20%) indicated that they would be unwilling 
to impose the death penalty under any circumstances and 
would therefore be classified as excludable. The percentage
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of psychologists in the present study found to be death- 
qualified in slightly lower than the percentages commonly 
reported in the jury literature by Fitzgerald and Ellsworth 
(1984). These investigators have reported a death-qualified 
rate of 83% when the population examined was adult men and 
women eligible for jury selection. In contrast, the 
percentage of psychologists in the present study who can be 
classified as excludable is somewhat higher than the 17% 
Fitzgerald and Ellsworth report. These small discrepancies 
may be attributable to the characteristics of the two 
populations sampled. It could be argued that male forensic 
psychologists comprise a more homogeneous group than the 
male and female sample of adults eligible for jury selection 
in terms of sex, education level, and occupation. One might 
expect the number of excludable psychologists to be somewhat 
higher than the 20% reported in the present study, based on 
the robust findings that increasing levels of education tend 
to attenuate belief in the death penalty (Cowan, Thompson, & 
Ellsworth, 1984; Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan, & Thompson, 1984; 
Ellsworth & Ross, 1982). Three possible explanations could 
be considered for the relatively large differences between 
the number of death-qualified and excludable psychologists. 
The first lies in the chosen speciality of forensic 
psychology. The criminal justice system in the United 
States, based on English common law, is an adversarial one. 
Exhibits, evidence, and witnesses are introduced by one side
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or the other with the sole purpose of convincing the 
fact-finder that a particular side's viewpoint is the 
truthful one (Wrightsman, 1991). Jurors have to choose 
between two versions of the truth, both of which are 
probably inaccurate to some degree. Sheppard and Vidmar 
(1980) have claimed that lawyers with the adversarial 
orientation produce biased accounts of events and facts 
among witnesses. Other critics of the adversarial model 
have contended that it promotes a competitive atmosphere 
that often distorts the truth about a dispute (Lind, 1982). 
Psychology, in contrast, is empirical in its orientation. 
Graduate training in the spirit of the scientists/ 
practitioner model advocates objectivity and impartiality 
when evaluating evidence. Clinically, the role of the 
psychologist is to understand and assist individuals to 
bring about therapeutic change by means of a supportive, 
helping relationship. Psychologists who find themselves in 
the midst of an adversarial arena, may then, experience 
moral dilemmas as they attempt to adhere to the profession's 
code of ethical conduct while being perceived by the courts 
as an advocate, rather than an unbiased scientist 
(Wrightsman, 1991). It is possible that psychologists who 
seek careers within such a system may tend to possess 
personal characteristics that are inherently different from 
those psychologists who decline participation in forensic- 
related services. The field may attract or reward
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individuals who are more comfortable with controversy and 
dispute associated with adversarial justice and ill-defined 
concepts such as "competency" and "insanity." Such 
individuals may be less likely to experience cognitive 
dissonance (e.g., the internal conflict associated with 
rendering an absolute judgment based on evidence that is 
inaccurate, imprecise, and often irrelevant) when placed in 
the adversarial arena of the courtroom or death-row. 
Secondly, the present socio-political climate tends to 
foster a "get tough" policy in regard to the suppression of 
crime in the United States. "Law and order" was the 
rallying cry during the presidential campaign of 1968. The 
election of Richard Nixon in that year symbolized a shift in 
the sympathies of the general population and witnessed the 
Supreme Court rendering decisions aimed at redressing the 
imbalance between suspects’ rights and society's rights 
(Wrightman, 1991). On one level, the reason the Supreme 
Court has moved toward restricting the rights of the accused 
over the last 20 years is that its newer members reflect the 
conservative political values of those who chose them 
(Nixon, Ford, Reagan, & Bush), yet shifts in the concerns of 
individual voters and society at large were responsible for 
the presidential elections and subsequent appointments 
(Wrightman, 1991). The public outcry against crime has 
continued to gain momentum over the last two decades and is 
reflected by the current administration's recent proposal of
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a bill to Congress that would expand the death penalty to 30 
more categories of crime. thus, there may be some sense of 
social responsibility, or concern for the protection of 
society at large that prompts forensic psychologists to 
support the death penalty for at least some capital 
offenses. The third possibility would be that a 
response-bias existed in the present sample and contributed 
to the large number of death-qualified psychologists 
reported in this study, i.e., those who were death-qualified 
were more inclined to participate as subjects or more 
interested in the topic of death penalty attitudes and 
competency for execution. This issue will be discussed in a 
later section.
A larger discrepancy between percentages of death- 
qualified and excludable psychologists occurred between the 
present study and a similar investigation by Wytucki (1990). 
Wytucki reported that 87% of the forensic psychologists 
included in his sample were death-qualified while 13% were 
excludable. Wytucki's popu1ation consisted of both male and 
female forensic psychologists, whereas the present study 
only sampled male forensic psychologists. The jury 
literature suggests that including females in the sample 
could likely increase the number of excludable individuals 
and decrease the number of death-qualified. The most likely 
explanation for Wytucki's higher percentage of death- 
qualified and lower percentage of excludable psychologists
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may lie, therefore, in the differing sampling techniques 
rather than characteristics of the samples. the Wytucki 
study was not a random sample from all 50 states. Only 
those psychologists currently residing in the 36 states that 
provide for the death penalty were included. This 
represents 72% of all of the states. In the present study, 
77% of the respondents were presently practicing in states 
that do authorize the death penalty (See Appendix Q), while 
23% of the respondents practiced in the remaining 14 states 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, 1989). It seems 
possible that Wytucki's number of death-qualified 
psychologists may have been somewhat inflated by the 
nonrandom sample. This explanation is supported by the 
present study that found that the psychologists practicing 
in states that provide for the death penalty were clearly 
more in favor of the death penalty than psychologists who 
practiced in states where no death penalty existed. Future 
investigators, therefore, would be well-advised to consider 
this biasing potential when designing similar 
investigations.
Death Penalty Attitudes, Death-qualification, and Competency 
Decisions
The present study found that the relationship between 
death penalty attitudes and a finding of competent for 
execution approached, but did not achieve statistical 
significance (£ < .06). It was clearly demonstrated,
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however, that the responding psychologists who did assess 
the death-row inmate as competent for execution were 
significantly more in favor of the death penalty than were 
the psychologists who determined that the inmate was 
incompetent for execution (£ < .01). Death-qualified 
psychologists were also found to be significantly more in 
favor of the death penalty than were excludable 
psychologists. Perhaps then, it is not so surprising that 
death-qualified psychologists in the present study were also 
more likely than excludable psychologists to assess the 
inmate as competent for execution. The basis for such a 
finding, however, is difficult to ascertain. Such results 
warrant great caution in their interpretation. A cause- 
effect relationship cannot be inferred based upon these data 
but a correlational relationship clearly is in evidence.
The present findings are contradictory to the Wytucki (1990) 
study that reported no relationships between death penalty 
attitudes or death-qualification and competency for 
execution decisions made by forensic psychologists. Designs 
of the two studies were similar. The four DSM-III-R 
diagnoses were the same, as was the demonstrated 
symptomatology. The test scores were virtually identical, 
as was the description of the inmate's current behavior on 
death-row. An important difference between the two studies, 
however, was the amount of information provided in the crime 
description. The Wytucki (1990) design allowed for only one
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crime description, and details were not elaborated. It was 
simply stated that the inmate had been convicted of shooting 
and killing a convenience store clerk during the course of 
an armed robbery. The present study, on the other hand, 
varied the crime description to include aggravating 
circumstances, such as a heinous description that portrayed 
the inmate not only stabbing the clerk to death, but then 
dismembering and burying the body parts. A clearly 
premeditated condition served as an aggravating factor as 
well. This was in contrast to an impulsive crime condition. 
Impulsivity has frequently been utilized in similar designs 
to suggest lessened responsibility on the part of the 
defendant, i.e„, a mitigating circumstance (Luginbuhl & 
Middendorf, 1988). These manipulations did appear to affect 
the outcome of the study, and this effect is discussed at 
length in a later section. Briefly, the death-qualified 
psychologists who received the heinous and premeditated 
crime conditions evaluated the inmate as competent to be 
executed significantly more often than did the death- 
qualified psychologists who received the non-heinous and 
impulsive crime conditions or the excludable psychologists 
who received the same crime conditions. It does seem 
plausible, therefore, that all else equal, the contradictory 
findings of this and the Wytucki (1990) study may be in part 
attributable to the experimental manipulations undertaken in 
the present study. When the psychologists here had access
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to additional information that did not pertain to the 
behavior in question (the inmate's current behavior on 
death-row), the death-qualified psychologists who received 
heinous or premeditated crime descriptions apparently were 
less able than the excludable psychologists to disregard 
this knowledge as irrelevant to the task at hand and assess 
only what was relevant to the issue of competency to be 
executed, i.e., the current mental status of the client.
This tends to support the concerns of Heilbrun (1987),
Grisso (1986), and other forensic psychologists who have 
pointed out the potential for a wide degree of variability 
in the way a psychologist may approach the problem of 
determining competency for execution. What is relevant to 
the issue of competency for execution and what is not has 
yet to be empirically determined, nor has the domain of 
behavior that is actually being assessed. These data 
reiterate the need for a standardized format that would: 
a) clearly elucidate the scope of information the examiner 
should have access to, and b) unmistakenly define the 
parameters of the competency evaluation in terms of specific 
questions the examiner should address.
Death penalty attitudes and their correlates have been 
studied extensively among perspective jurors, but associated 
factors that have been examined have generally been 
conviction-proneness, favoring the prosecution, and 
rejection of the insanity defense. The issue of competency
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has never been addressed. Fitzgerald and Ellsworth (1984) 
have suggested that the tendency for death-qualified jurors 
to trust the prosecution more than the defense, vote for 
conviction more often than acquittal and mistrust the 
insanity defense may be attributable .:o contrasting 
ideological orientations held by those who favor or oppose 
the death penalty. These authors and others, such as 
Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan, and Thompson (1984), postulate 
that excludable jurors tend to support due-process values 
that emphasize the fallibility of the criminal justice system 
in apprehending, trying, and convicting lawbreakers. Death- 
qualified jurors, they argue, tend to embrace crime-control 
values. Crime-control values support the contention that 
the most important function of the criminal justice system 
is repressing crime. The basic assumption of the crime- 
control ideology has been stated "anyone who breaks the law 
should pay the price, regardless of due-process guarantees, 
and that society must protect itself against criminals by 
means of swift, certain, and severe punishment." Unlike 
jurors, however, psychologists are trained and ethically 
obligated to evaluate clients in an objective, unbiased 
fashion. At no time in a psychologist's career will the 
burden of responsibility be so profound in its consequences 
to all parties directly and indirectly involved than in the 
case of assessing competency to be executed. It seems 
implausible, therefore, to consider that underlying
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sociopolitical orientations could derail scientific 
objectivity. A more plausible explanation for the 
relationship between death-qualification and a determination 
of competency for execution demonstrated in the present 
study may be that death-qualified and excludable 
psychologists adhere to contrasting philosophical 
orientations on the issue that Wrightsman (1991) has called 
"the first dilemma" in the relationship between psychology 
and law: the rights of individuals versus the rights of the 
accused. Wrightsman has asserted that psychologists must 
choose between four contrasting roles they will play within 
the criminal justice system: "pure" scientist, applied 
scientist, policy evaluator, or advocate. If the 
psychologist perceives himself/herself to be an advocate, 
then they must decide which values the law should reflect: 
protection of the rights of specific individuals, or 
protection of society at large. The present study did not 
assess the respondents perceived role within the legal 
system, nor did it address the larger issue of the 
psychologists' value systems in terms of the rights of 
society versus the rights of the accused. Future 
investigators might consider that development of a scale 
that would quantify these perceptions would be an asset to 
research in this area. Although speculative, it seems 
plausible that psychologists who are so strongly opposed to 
the death penalty that they would refuse to impose it even
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when aggravating circumstances, or those factors that make a 
particular murder even worse than a ’’typical'' murder are 
involved (excludable psychologists) might tend to hold 
values consistent with protecting the rights of specific 
individuals, in this case, the accused. Psychologists who 
admit that they would consider aggravating factors in some 
cases and be willing to impose the death penalty accordingly 
(death-qualified psychologists) might tend to embrace values 
more consistent with protection of society at large, or the 
common good. Such a theory might predict that death- 
qualified psychologists could conceivably be more attentive 
or sensitive to aggravating factors than excludable 
psychologists. The present study tends to support this 
hypothesis.
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
With respect to aggravating circumstances, results 
indicated a significanc difference between death-qualified 
and excludable psychologists over all aggravating 
circumstances (heinous crime and premeditated crime). There 
was not, however, a significant overall difference between 
death-qualified and excludable psychologists with respect to 
mitigating circumstances (impulsive crime and 
psychopathology). Specifically, it was found that when the 
inmate’s crime had been premeditated or heinous, the 
psychologists who rated themselves as favoring the death 
penalty (regardless of death-qualified or excludable
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classification) and the psychologists who indicated they 
would be willing to impose the death penalty (death- 
qualified) were more likely to assess the inmate competent 
for execution than were the psychologists who rated 
themselves in opposition to the death penalty and those who 
indicated that they would be unwilling to impose the death 
penalty (excludable). In contrast, when the inmate's crime 
was impulsive or non-heinous, the competency ratings of the 
psychologists were statistically equivalent. It seems 
possible that cases in which the victim was treated in an 
extremely violent and heinous manner could intensify moral 
outrage and heighten feelings of social and moral obligation 
to the victim and society at large while accentuating the 
perception of dangerousness on the part of the perpetrator. 
The perceived need to protect society from such dangerous 
elements by the surest means available could conceivably 
reduce the dissonance associated with the implication or 
assessing that individual as competent to be executed.
Thus, it may be that death-qualified psychologists tend to 
interpret evidence in a way that allows for a measure of 
consistency between their ideological orientations toward 
the death penalty and reduce any dissonance that might be 
associated with finding a death-row inmate competent to be 
executed, which some authors have claimed is tantamount to 
"assisting" with an execution (Radelet & Barnard, 1986).
The present findings are in accordance with those of
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Luginbuhl and Middendorf (1988) who demonstrated that in a 
sample of potential jurors, there was a significant 
difference between death-qualified and excludable jurors 
over all aggravating circumstances, but no overall 
difference in regard to mitigating circumstances, with the 
exception of one particular mitigating factor. The 
excludable jurors were significantly more likely to accept 
emotional disturbance as a mitigating circumstance than were 
the death-qualified jurors. Although no statistical 
relationship between willingness to impose the death penalty 
and any mitigating factors emerged in the present study, the 
majority of excludable psychologists found for "not” 
competent for execution on the part of the death-row inmate 
under two conditions of psychopathology: paranoid 
schizophrenia (63%) and organic brain syndrome (56%). The 
majority (66%) of death-qualified psychologists, however, 
found for "competent" for execution under the organic brain 
syndrome condition. Under the paranoid schizophrenia 
condition their decisions were evently split with 50% 
determining the schizophrenic competent and 50% determining 
him not competent. The two studies, of course, are not 
directly comparable. The populations and research questions 
investigated were vastly different. It does appear, 
however, that the decisions of the death-qualified 
psychologists in the present study were influenced by 
similar variables (i.e., variables that represented
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aggravating factors) that influenced the decisions of 
death-qualified jurors. The excludable psychologists in the 
present study also appeared more willing to accept pathology 
as a mitigating factor, similar to Luginbuhl and 
Middendorf’s (1988) excludable jurors. These authors 
speculated that jurors with a death penalty bias foster 
differing receptivity to evidence supporting aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances than jurors who are fundamentally 
opposed to the death penalty.
The present study also found that when the prisoner had 
been previously diagnosed as antisocial personality 
disorder, death-qualification, but not death penalty 
attitude was significantly related to a finding of competent 
for execution, i.e., those psychologists who favored the 
death penalty were no more likely to evaluate the antisocial 
inmate as competent for execution as were those who opposed 
the death penalty, but the death-qualified psychologists 
were significantly more likely to evaluate the antisocial 
competent to be executed than were the excludable. Although 
speculative, it is conceivable that within the framework of 
the proposed hypothesis, a diagnosis of antisocial 
personality disorder could possibly be construed as an 
aggravating rather than mitigating factor, and an 
orientation denoting dangerousness that is enduring and 
intractable in nature. If so, such a diagnosis might serve 
to attenuate potential dissonance associated with allowing
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the execution to proceed. In any case, it does seem 
possible that the psychologists in the present sample did 
not view the antisocial disorder as a mitigating 
circumstances that lessened the responsibility of the 
inmate, since they rated the prisoner with antisocial 
personality disorder as significantly more legally 
responsible for committing the crime than the prisoners with 
paranoid schizophrenia and organic brain disorder, and 
equally responsible for his crime as the inmate diagnosed 
previously as adjustment disorder (essentially, no 
psychopathology). Yet, when asked to evaluate the amount of 
impact the previous pathology had on the commission of the 
capital crime, the psychologists, both death-qualified and 
excludable, rated the inmate with antisocial personality 
disorder as much affected by the disorder as they believed 
the paranoid schizophrenic and organic brain syndrome 
inmates were affected by their pathologies. Making the 
distinction that sociopathy had an equal impact on behavior 
as paranoid schizophrenia and organic grain syndrome but 
equating it with no psychopathology with respect to legal 
responsibility for behavior tends to suggest that neither 
the death-qualified psychologists nor the excludable 
psychologists tended to view antisocial personality disorder 
as a mitigating circumstance.
Evaluation of Evidence
An interesting aspect of the present study was that
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while death penalty attitude was marginally related and 
death-qualification was significantly related to the 
competency decisions of the psychologists, these variables 
were not related to any other decisions the psychologists 
were asked to make. When quantifying the impact the 
psychopathology of the inmate had on the commission of the 
crime, the inmate's legal responsibility for the crime, and 
the likelihood that the inmate was malingering on death row, 
the death-qualified and excludable psychologists were 
statistically equivalent in their determinations. Neither 
did the two groups differ in their perceptions of how 
heinous, impulsive, or premeditated the crimes were believed 
to be. they also rated the importance of the four 
information sources (social history, crime description, 
current behavior on death-row, and test scores) similarly. 
Thus, the null hypotheses could not be rejected for every 
decision the two groups of psychologists made with the 
exception of the decision relating to competency to be 
executed. When making this decision, the death-qualified 
psychologists were apparently more attentive to the crime 
description and more sensitive to it when it reflected the 
presence of aggravating factors. The diagnosis of 
sociopathy also appeared to affect the death-qualified's 
competency decisions.
Factors Associated with Competency for Execution
The inmate assessed as competent for execution was
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generally believed by both the death-qualified and the 
excludable psychologists to be less affected by his previous 
psychopathology and more legally responsible for his actions 
during the commission of the crime than was the incompetent 
inmate. A large difference was demonstrated between the 
legal responsibility ratings given by the psychologists who 
later assessed the inmate incompetent for execution and the 
psychologists who later determined that he was competent. A 
score of 7.00 indicated that the psychologists believed the 
inmate was "completely” legally responsible for his actions 
during the commission of the crime. A score of 1.00 
indicated that the inmate was determined to be "not at all" 
legally responsible. The mean score for the psychologists 
who later assessed the inmate competent for execution was 
6.16, compared to A.71 for the psychologists who later 
assessed the inmate as incompetent to be executed. This 
tends to raise the interesting notion that the psychologists 
in the present sample may have conceived of competency for 
execution as existing on a continuum with other legal 
competencies, e.g., the legal competency of the inmate at 
the time of the crime in question and during the trial 
proceedings. It was stated in the crime description that 
the defendant's competency was not raised as an issue at the 
time of the capital trial. These results tend to suggest 
that the psychologists who believed that the prisoner was 
legally competent when he committed the crime and when he
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was tried in court also believed that he was competent at the 
time of the request for an evaluation for competency for 
execution. The psychologists who rated the prisoner 
incompetent or of questionable competency when he committed 
the crime also appeared to remain consistent in their belief 
that the prisoner was still incompetent and should not be 
executed under the circumstances. Further supporting 
evidence for such a contention is demonstrated by the self- 
rated importance the psychologists attached to the various 
information sources from which they formulated their 
competency decisions. Each subject was supplied with four 
sources of information related to the death-row inmate.
They were asked to rate each information source in terms of 
its overall importance in their competency for execution 
decision-making process. The inmate's social history was 
unremarkable and depicted normal development until late 
adolescence, at which time the prisoner began to demonstrate 
symptomatology consistent with one of the four 
psychopathologies. A formal DMS III-R diagnosis was 
included. The crime description not only detailed the 
prisoner's crime but included the statement "the defendant's 
competency was not raised as an issue at the time of the 
trial." The test scores were designed to reflect the DSM 
III-R diagnosis contained in the social history. The WAIS-R 
indicated that the inmate was functioning in the average 
range of intellectual capacity, and the MMPI-1 was
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consistent with moderate symptomatology. This information 
source pointed out, however, that, the test battery had been 
administered 3 years prior to the currently requested 
competency evaluation, at the time of the inmate's admission 
to death-row. Thus, it was noted that the test scores were 
not current. Finally, a description of the inmate's current 
behavior, which had caused his attorney to question his 
competency to be executed was provided. This was designed 
to reflect a degree of ambiguity, in that at times the 
prisoner appeared lucid and oriented and at other times, 
frankly psychotic. Interestingly, the two groups of 
psychologists (those who determined competent versus those 
who determined not competent for execution) maintained a 
high degree of consistency in their decisions across 
different inmate behaviors related to the issue of 
competency. Those who rated the inmate as legally 
responsible at the time of the crime tended to also rate the 
prisoner as malingering on death-row and therefore attached 
little significance to the inmates questionable current 
behavior. Instead, they endorsed the three-year-old test 
scores and crime description as more important in 
formulating their competency decision, and in the end, 
assessed the inmate as competent to be executed. A rank 
ordering of means indicated that those psychologists who 
found for competency for execution considered first the 
prisoner's test scores, then the crime description, followed
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by the social history, and finally, his current behavior on 
death-row. Those psychologists who apparently questioned 
the legal competency of the inmate at the time of the crime 
in question, however, did not appear to doubt the 
authenticity of the behavior on death-row, and indeed 
attached significantly greater importance to the inmate's 
current behavior than to any other source of information, 
and to finally conclude that the inmate was incompetent for 
execution. Rank ordering of means for the psychologists who 
found for incompetency to be executed demonstrated that they 
endorsed the inmate's current behavior on death row as the 
most important criteria for the formulation of their 
decision, followed by his test scores, then the social 
history, and finally, the crime description.
Limitations of the Present Study
The validity of this study's results and the extent to 
which they can be generalized to other populations are 
restricted primarily by sample characteristics and the 
limitations associated with survey methodology. More 
importantly, the present study was correlational in nature, 
and thus is limited in discerning causative factors or 
explaining directionality in existing relationships.
The present study investigated a sensitive and complex 
issue that required thoughtful self-examination. The survey 
format utilizing self-administered questionnaires appeared 
to be the most practical and appropriate means of obtaining
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the research goals while ensuring the confidentiality of 
respondents. In the context of validity and reliability, 
survey research is frequently seen as generally weak on the 
former and strong on the latter (Babbie, 1979). There is an 
artificiality associated with the survey format. People's 
opinions on issues seldom take the form of strongly 
agreeing, agreeing, disagreeing, or strongly disagreeing 
with a specific statement. This, together with the 
potential differences between subjects who choose to respond 
to a survey and those who choose not to respond puts a 
strain on its validity. Survey research, however, by 
presenting all subjects with a standardized stimulus, helps 
in eliminating unreliability in observations made by the 
researcher. Moreover, careful wording and ordering of the 
questions can also reduce the subjects' own unreliability.
The overall response rate is one guide to the 
representativeness of the sample respondents. The present 
study achieved an overall response rate of 40%. Although 
adequate for analyses and within generally acceptable 
limits, this relatively low return is a serious limitation 
that raises the concern that a significant response bias may 
have occurred. It could be argued, however, that the 
professionals sampled in the present study may have 
perceived themselves as personally invested in its outcome, 
from both a professional and an economic vantage point. 
Therefore, one might expect that the respondents would
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attempt to present themselves in an even more positive light 
than what research indicates most survey subjects do. This 
phenomenon, however, did not appear to occur. The 
responding psychologists did admit to strong biases either 
in favor of or against the death penalty. Furthermore, 45 
(14%) of the respondents took the time from their busy 
schedules to include lengthy comments about their personal 
feelings related to the topic, or wrote separate letters.
One respondent wrote the investigator a 3-page letter and 
included two examples of competency evaluations he had 
submitted to the courts. Another fed all the data describing 
the inmate’s test scores into his personal computer program 
and generated a written profile of the inmate. He then 
personally called the investigator to discuss his opinions 
related to the design and the implications of psychologists 
participating in such areas of controversy. Still another 
participant called the investigator's advisor to express 
various concerns. The following examples are some of the 
psychologist's additional comments and attest to the high 
degree of emotional intensity the present study apparently 
generated among some participants: "I would guess that, on 
the basis of this study, you will try to publish a paper 
reaching conclusions about psychologists' judgements about 
competency. I believe that this is a good example of the 
triumph of a false 'scientism' in psychology.... I also 
believe that 'analogue' studies are a waste of time."
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Another psychologist, wrote: "Please don't let me hurt your 
student efforts by requesting a response by sending me a 
reminder letter or a second mail-out... I can't support this 
survey as, as described, it is an unacceptable try at 
research for a psychology doctorate." Still another 
psychologist wrote: "You are presumptious to undertake a 
study of such serious nature in a population of experts... 
Should you attempt to publish results in any reputable 
journal, critical analysis would be overwhejming. I would 
not waste my time on such a fruitless endeavor."
It is understandable that many psychologists 
demonstrated negative affective responses to the present 
topic. The participation of psychologists, psychiatrists, 
and other medical professionals in the execution process is 
highly controversial, with the two opposing sides elegantly 
arguing their ethical concerns. Fifty-nine psychologists 
(18%) of the 322 respondents in the present study had 
actually evaluated inmates on death-row to determine their 
competency. These psychologists were statistically as 
likely to be excludable as death-qualified. The 59 
psychologists had completed a total of 260 competency for 
execution evaluations. Only five psychologists who included 
critical assessments of the study or the topic itself came 
from the group who had actually been a part of the 
competency for execution process. The remaining 40 comments 
came from psychologists who had never participated. Of the
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total number of comments or feedback received (45), 69% came 
from death-qualified psychologists. The topic itself could 
be profoundly disturbing to many psychologists and their 
death penalty attitudes may be intensely personal. It is 
possible that some of the psychologists construed the 
present study as an attempt to challenge their credibility 
or moral character. This was not, however, the purpose of 
the investigation. The goal, rather, was to systematically 
determine the kinds of factors and information that 
psychologists consider salient to the issue of competency 
for execution, and to correlate death penalty attitudes with 
competency determinations.
On a more positive note, 45% of the respondents 
requested an abstract of the results, including most of the 
psychologists who attached negative comments and criticisms. 
A few respondents had favorable reactions to the study. One 
such psychologist wrote: "This is worthwhile research on a 
topic of utmost importance and interest in the world of 
forensic psychology." Considering the degree of emotional 
involvement evidenced by the relatively large number of 
psychologists who included unsolicited comments and 
material, it seems possible that response-bias did not 
significantly affect the study's outcome. Unbiased data 
would appear to be a more favorable attribute than a high 
response rate.
The present design provided limited data pertaining to
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the death row inmate. This was done to facilitate the 
probability of a response and for reasons of economic 
feasibility. Many respondents attached comments to their 
returns indicating that the data provided was insufficient 
to make an adequate determination of competency. This point 
is V7ell-taken. The cost of a "real world" non-analog 
design, however, would have been prohibitive and likely to 
lower the response rate, based on the time-consuming task of 
reading and interpreting extensive data. Future research, 
however, would do well to closely approximate the actual 
assessment procedures taking place on death row, and provide 
for the subjects the same information to which the 
evaluating psychologist has access. Whenever possible, 
actual material related to a "real world" situation should 
be used, i.e., videotaped interviews with death-row 
prisoners, and test batteries that have been administered to 
real, rather than fictitious inmates. Future surveys might 
attempt to elicit information that would clarify the role 
within the criminal justice system forensic psychologists 
perceive themselves to play: be it that of "advocate" or 
"pure" scientist. The latter role is rate within our 
present system (Wrightsman, 1991). Wrightsman has asserted 
that regardless of the professional's own viewpoint, the 
lawyers, jury and the judge tend to perceive the 
psychologist as an advocate, and as such, he/she is expected 
to align their loyalty with one side or the other i.e., the
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prosecution or the defense, or more globally, the protection 
of the rights of specific individuals, or the common good of 
society at large. Collection of such data might help to 
disentangle the complex relationships between attitudes 
related to the death penalty and the various decisions 
psychologists are asked to make.
Conclusion
More than three-fourths of United States citizens 
support the death penalty (Wrightsman, 1991). The 
percentage has increased in recent years, reflecting a 
national shift toward the crime-control model and away from 
the due-process model of criminal justice values (Walker, 
1985). It does not appear likely that the Supreme Court 
will reject the death penalty in the near future. There 
will remain a conflict between law and psychology, based on 
the increasing demand for psychological services to 
defendants as well as prisoners facing sentences of death. 
The conflict is reflected in the preamble to the Code of 
Ethical Principles of Psychologists: "Psychologists respect 
the dignity and worth of the individual and strive for the 
preservation and protection of fundamental human rights.
They are committed to increasing knowledge of human behavior 
and of people's understanding of themselves and others and 
to the utilization of such knowledge for the promotion of
human welfare.... " Each psychologist must decide for
him/herself whether or not participation in competency for
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execution evaluations is ethnically defensible. The dilemma 
will become more profound with the recent publication of 
Justice Sandra O'Connor's majority opinion stating: "There 
is unsufficient evidence of a national consensus against 
executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital 
offenses for us to conclude that it is prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment" (cruel and unusual punishment)
(Wrightsman, 1991). This opinion is in reference to a 
severely retarded black man with an IQ of 66 electrocuted in 
Virginia in 1985. In the only systematic clinical 
investigation of the neuropsychiatric status of individuals 
condemned to death, Lewis, Pincus, Feldman, Jackson, & Bard 
(1986) conclude that "the possibility exists that death-row 
inmates comprise an especially neuropsychiatrically impaired 
prison population whose pervasive inadequacies make them 
less capable than other defendants either of obtaining 
competent representation at the time of the trial or 
assisting their attorneys in the time-consuming work of 
documenting the kinds of neuropsychiatric impairments that 
would be significant for mitigation,"
As the number of individuals who have lived for years 
on death row increases, so too will the number of pleas of 
execution incompetency. More and more capital inmates may 
be expected to develop serious mental illness, and 
psychologists will be called upon to evaluate or treat them 
in ever-increasing numbers. At present, there is little
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consensus among states on the test for competency for 
execution (Heilbrun, 1987). The present study demonstrates 
a similar lack of consensus among psychologists in regard to 
the behavior of an inmate that may suggest incompetency.
The competency decisions of the psychologists in the present 
sample appeared to be influenced by factors other than the 
current mental status of the inmate in question. This 
indicates a clear and pressing need to clarify the nature of 
competency for execution. Particularly relevant is the need 
to define and standardize the domain of behavior that is to 
be assessed. Further research should be directed toward 
disentangling the complex relationship between the 
examiner's own attitudes and potential biases and the 
objective decisions they are asked to render. Competency 
for execution presents far more compelling ethical questions 
for mental health professionals than do other legal 
competencies yet this area of research has been virtually 
ignored. Clearly, the topic is amenable to systematic 
scientific investigation and, sensitivities aside, further 
research is warranted to determine who is appropriate to 
administer such assessments and how they should proceed.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
CONSENT FORM
You are cordially invited to participate in a 
dissertation study that is intended to investigate attitudes 
among psychologists related to the death penalty, the 
insanity defense, and the question of competency for 
execution.
You have been selected randomly from all male Ph.D. 
clinical psychologists listing forensic services in the 
National Registry of Health Service Providers. Your name 
will never be attached to the data you provide, or used in 
any way. Your participation is strictly confidential and on 
a voluntary basis.
If you choose to participate, we feel you will 
contribute valuable data that will serve to clarify the 
complex and sensitive issues surrounding the insanity 
defense and competency of death-row inmates for execution.
While realizing that in real-life settings, your 
decisions regarding such profound issues would be based on a 
thoughtful and comprehensive review of any and all relevant 
information, we nave elected to be sensitive to your 
time-demands by limiting the data we hope to collect from 
you. Fifteen minutes of your time would be required to read 
the enclosed material and complete a brief 11-item 
questionnaire based on the social history, crime description, and current behavior of a fictitious death-row 
inmate.
For your convenience, a self-addressed, stamped 
envelope is included for returning the consent form, and 
questionnaire. Please respond and return the questionnaires 
as soon as possible. Results of the study will be mailed to 
you upon request.
Your time and cooperation is greatly appreciated.
I, ______________________  have read all of the above and
willingly agree to participate in the study.
If you have any questions regarding the present study, 
feel free to direct them to Sharon Brown, M.A., Department 
of Psychology, University of North Dakota (701-777-3451).
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APPENDIX B
WITHERSPOON DEATH QUALIFICATION CRITERIA 
Assume that you have been called as a possible juror in 
a capital case. Answer the following questions as 
accurately as possible.
Are you strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat 
opposed, or strongly opposed to the death penalty?
STRONGLY IN FAVOR........ 1
SOMEWHAT IN FAVOR............ .2
SOMEWHAT OPPOSED.........  3
STRONGLY OPPOSED.............. 4
Now assume that you've been called as a possible juror 
in a first degree murder trial. The prosecutor is asking 
for the death sentence. Since this is a case where the 
death penalty may be imposed, the judge will ask you certain 
questions about your attitudes toward the death penalty 
before deciding whether you should be chosen to serve on 
the jury.
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There are two parts to any trial where the death 
penalty may be imposed. In the first part, the jury decides 
whether the person on trial is guilty or not guilty. If the 
person is found guilty, there is a second part--a separate 
trial--in which the jury decides whether he or she should 
get the death penalty, or life in prison.
The judge will ask you the following question:
"Is your attitude toward the death penalty such that as 
a juror you would be unwilling to impose it in any case, no 
matter what the evidence was, or would you consider voting
to impose it in at least some cases?"
How would you answer? Would you say...
(READ EACH ANSWER CHOICE)
I WOULD BE UNWILLING TO VOTE TO
IMPOSE IT IN ANY CASE................... 1
OR: I WOULD CONSIDER VOTING TO IMPOSE
IT IN SOME CASES........................  2
Now suppose that you were a juror in the first part of 
the trial, just to decide whether the accused person is 
guilty or not guilty of the crime. The judge instructs you 
that in reaching your verdict you are only allowed to 
consider the evidence presented in court, and must follow 
the law as he will state it to you. If the accused is found 
guilty, there will be a separate trial to decide whether or 
not he or she should get the death penalty.
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Which of the following expresses what you would do if 
you were a juror for the first part, of the trial?
(READ EACH ANSWER CHOICE).
I WOULD FOLLOW THE JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS AND 
DECIDE THE QUESTION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE IN A 
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL MANNER BASED ON THE EVIDENCE AND
LAW..................................................  1
OR: I WOULD NOT BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL IN DECIDING THE
QUESTION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE, KNOWING THAT IF 
THE PERSON WAS CONVICTED HE OR SHE MIGHT GET THE 
DEATH PENALTY........................................ 2
APPENDIX C
SOCIAL HISTORY: PARANOID SCHIZOPHRENIC 
The defendant, Mr. Anthony Jones, is a 24 year old, 
never married, Caucasian male. His parents own and operate 
a successful restaurant. They report that Mr. Jones 
progressed through all developmental milestones at a normal 
rate. There is no history of physical, sexual, or 
psychologist abuse. Mr. Jones graduated from high school 
with a 2.00 grade-point average and enrolled in a local 
business college. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Jones began to 
demonstrate social withdrawal, evidenced by long periods of 
seclusion in his dormitory room. His grades markedly 
deteriorated as his behavior became increasingly more 
bizarre. He reported that he was a messenger from God and 
that Satan and his disciples were trying to poison him. He 
maintained that he often heard the voice of Satan mocking 
him. Shortly after his twentieth birthday, Mr. Jones was 
hospitalized and diagnosed by a clinical psychologist as a 
paranoid schizophrenic. He was discharged after four weeks
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APPENDIX D
SOCIAL HISTORY: ANTI-SOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER 
The defendant, Mr. Anthony Jones, is a 24 year old, 
never married, Caucasian male. His parents own and operate 
a successful restaurant. They report that Mr. Jones 
progressed through all developmental milestones at a normal 
rate. There is no history of physical, sexual, or 
psychologist abuse. At the age of 12, Mr. Jones began to 
demonstrate frequent truancy from school,1 cruelty to his 
peers, and a propensity to engage in frequent fighting. He 
graduated from high school with a 2.00 grade-point average 
and enrolled in a local business college. Shortly 
thereafter, Mr. Jones was arrested for minor property 
damage. Several other convictions followed, including 
shoplifting, and drunk driving. Shortly after his twentieth 
birthday, Mr. Jones was incarcerated for theft and underwent 
a court-ordered psychological evaluation. He was diagnosed 
by a clinical psychologist as anti-social personality 
disorder. He was released from jail after a period of four 
weeks.
124
APPENDIX E
SOCIAL HISTORY: ORGANIC BRAIN SYNDROME 
The defendant, Mr. Anthony Jones, is a 24 year old, 
never married, Caucasian male. His parents own and operate 
a successful restaurant. They report that Mr. Jones 
progressed through all developmental milestones at a normal 
rate. There is no history of physical, sexual, or 
psychological abuse. He graduated from high school with a 
2.00 grade-point average and enrolled in a local business 
college. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Jones was involved in a 
motorcycle accident which resulted in severe head trauma.
He began to demonstrate affectively unstable behavior, 
marked by frequent fluctuations between depression, anxiety, 
and irritability. On occasion, he demonstrated aggressive 
outbursts and reported suspicion of the motive of others.
He was hospitalized shortly after his twentieth birthday and 
diagnosed by a clinical psychologist as organic brain 
syndrome. He was discharged in four weeks.
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APPENDIX F
SOCIAL HISTORY: ADJUSTMENT DISORDER WITH ANXIOUS MOOD 
The defendant, Mr. Anthony Jones, is a 24 year old, 
never married, Caucasian male. His parents own and operate 
a successful restaurant. They report that Mr. Jones 
progressed through all developmental milestones at a normal 
rate. There is no history of physical, sexual, or 
psychological abuse. Mr. Jones graduated from high school 
with a 2.00 grade-point average and enrolled in a local 
business college. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Jones began to 
experience anxiety related to the demands of a current 
relationship and maintaining his academic goals. Shortly 
after his twentieth birthday, he voluntarily sought therapy 
from a clinical psychologist, who indicated that Mr. Jones 
demonstrated some features of adjustment disorder with 
anxious mood. Mr. Jones continued in therapy for a period 
of four weeks.
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APPENDIX G
CRIME DESCRIPTION: HEINOUS/IMPULSIVE 
On the night of September 14, 1987, Mr. Jones, by his 
own admission, entered a convenience store and demanded all 
of the money in the register. The clerk, alone in the store 
at the time, complied with this request. Upon receipt of 
the money, Mr. Jones gagged the victim with the victim's 
handkerchief and bound his hands with rope he found in the 
store. He led the victim to a wooded area behind the 
convenience store and proceeded to torture the victim until 
the victim appeared to lose consciousness. Mr. Jones 
admitted that he then dismembered the body with the victim's 
hunting knife and hid the remains in the convenience store 
dumpster. A diary found in Mr. Jones's possession at the 
time of the arrest indicated that he was concerned over his 
recent impulsive spending of a small inheritance and his 
increasing debt, but did not allude to the crime in 
question. The defendant was found guilty of armed robbery 
and first degree murder and sentenced to death. The 
defendant's competency was not raised as an issue at the 
time of the trial.
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APPENDIX H
CRIME DESCRIPTION: HEINOUS/PREMEDITATED 
On the night of September 14, 1987, Mr. Jones, by his 
own admission, entered a convenience store armed with a 
knife and demanded all of the money in the register. The 
clerk, alone in the store at the time, complied with this 
request. Upon receipt of the money, Mr. Jones bound and 
gagged the victim with rope he had purchased earlier in the 
day. He transported the victim in his own vehicle to a 
pre-selected secluded area outside the city limits, where he 
proceeded to torture the victim until the victim appeared to 
lose consciousness. Mr. Jones then admitted chat he 
dismembered the victim and buried the dismembered body parts 
in several different locations. A diary found in Mr.
Jones's possession at the time of the arrest contained a 
detailed description of the convenience store and the 
secluded location at which the dismembered body parts were 
later recovered. The entry was dated 3 days prior to the 
date the crime was committed. The defendant was found 
guilty of armed robbery and first degree murder and 
sentenced to death. The defendant's competency was not 
raised as an issue at the time of the trial.
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APPENDIX I
CRIME DESCRIPTION: NON-HEINOUS/IMPULSIVE 
On the night cf September 14, 1987, Mr. Jones, by his 
own admission, entered a convenience store and demanded all 
the money in the register. The clerk, alone in the store at 
the time, complied with this request. Upon receipt of the 
money, Mr. Jones stabbed the victim with his own hunting 
knife and fled the scene. A diary found in Mr. Jones's 
possession at the time of arrest indicated that he was 
concerned over his recent impulsive spending of a small 
inheritance and his increasing debt, but did not allude to 
the crime in question. The defendant was found guilty of 
armed robbery and first degree murder and sentenced to 
death. The defendant's competency was not raised as an 
issue at the time of the trial.
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APPENDIX J
CRIME DESCRIPTION: NON-HEINOUS/PREMEDITATED 
On. the night of September 14, 1987, Mr. Jones, by his 
own admission, entered a convenience store armed with a 
knife and demanded all the money in the register. The 
clerk, alone in the store at the time, complied with this 
request. Upon receipt of the money, Mr. Jones transported 
the victim in his own vehicle to a pre-selected secluded 
area outside the city limits. He stabbed the victim and 
buried the body in a shallow grave he had prepared earlier 
in the day. A diary found in Mr. Jones's possession at the 
time cf arrest contained a detailed description of the 
convenience store and the secluded location of the victim's 
grave. The entry was dated 3 days prior to the date the 
crime was committed. The defendant was found guilty of armed 
robbery and first degree murder and sentenced to death. The 
defendant's competency was not raised as an issue at the 
time of the trial.
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APPENDIX K
CURRENT BEHAVIOR ON DEATH ROW 
Since the sentencing, Mr. Jones has spent 3 years on 
death row. During this time, he has been described by the 
guards as an "ideal inmate." His execution has been delayed 
due to ongoing appeals by his attorney. Recently Mr. Jones 
has demonstrated behavior that has caused his attorney to 
question his competency. His attorney has requested that a 
psychological evaluation be administered to determine if his 
client is competent for execution. The results of the 
evaluation indicated that while at times, Mr. Jones appears 
very lucid and oriented, he frequently becomes very 
withdrawn and refuses to speak. Occasionally, he will 
remain tightly curled in a fetal position for hours. During 
these times, Mr. Jones appears to be unaware of his 
impending execution, as he indicates to the examiner that he 
will be going home soon and that he has no idea why he is in 
prison. He voices the fear that prison guards are trying to 
kill him. Within the last month he has demonstrated one 
episode of unconstrained violence where he attacked a guard. 
The Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised and the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory were 
administered upon Mr. Jones's admission to prison. The 
scores were as follows:
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APPENDIX L
TEST SCORES: PARANOID SCHIZOPHRENIC 
WAIS-R SCALED SCORES
Verbal Tests Performance Tests
Information 13 Picture Completion 14
Digit Span 12 Picture Arrangement 14
Vocabulary 13 Block Design 10
Arithmetic 12 Object Assembly 10
Comprehens ion 9 Digit Symbol 10
Similarities 9
Total 68 Total 58
VERBAL IQ 105
PERFORMANCE IQ
107
FULL SCALE IQ 106
MMPI-1 PROFILE T SCORES
L 50 Hs+5K 53
F 80 D 57
K 52 Hy 55
Pd+4K 64
Mf 52
Pa 75
Pt+IK 52
Sc+IK 80
Ma+2K 64
Si 53
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APPENDIX M
TEST SCORES: ANTI-SOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER 
WAIS-R SCALED SCORES
Verbal Tests Performance Tests
Information 12 Picture Completion 10
Digit Span 10 Picture Arrangement 14
Vocabulary 11 Block Design 11
Arithmetic 11 Object Assembly 10
Comprehens ion 11 Digit Symbol 9
Similarities 13
Total 68 Total 58
VERBAL IQ 105
PERFORMANCE IQ
105
FULL SCALE IQ 105
MMPI-1 PROFILE T SCORES
L 50 Hs+5K 52
F 70 D 58
K 48 Hy 55
Pd+4K 75
Mf 51
Pa 53
Pt+IK 52
Sc+IK 67
Ma+2K 74
Si 40
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APPENDIX N
TEST SCORES: ORGANIC BRAIN SYNDROME 
WAIS-R SCALED SCORES 
WAIS-R SCALED SCORES
Verbal Tests Performance Tests
Information 13 Picture Completion 11
Digit Span 8 Picture Arrangement 11
Vocabulary 13 Block Design 7
Arithmetic 104 Object Assembly 8
Comprehens ion 13 Digit Symbol 10
Similarities 10
Total 66 Total 47
VERBAL IQ 108
PERFORMANCE IQ
92
FULL SCALE IQ 100
MMPI-1 PROFILE T SCORES
L 60 Hs+5K 70
F 70 D 57
K 49 Hy 77
Pd+4K 68
Mf 51
Pa 53
Pt+IK 52
Sc+IK 80
Ma+2K 70
Si 52
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APPENDIX N
TEST SCORES:
Verbal Tests
Information 12
Digit Span 8
Vocabulary 11
Arithmetic 9
Comprehens ion 12
Similarities 12
Total 64
ADJUSTMENT DISORDER WITH ANXIOUS MOOD
WAIS-R SCALED SCORES
WAIS-R SCALED SCORES
Performance Tests
Picture Completion 11
Picture Arrangement 10
Block Design 9
Object Assembly 11
Digit Symbol 11
Total 52
VERBAL IQ 104
PERFORMANCE IQ
104
FULL SCALE IQ 104
MMPI-1 PROFILE T SCORES
L 30 Hs+5K 70
F 70 D 75
K 45 Hy 56
Pd+4K 57
Mf 51
Pa 52
Pt+IK 65
Sc+IK 53
Ma+2K 53
Si 52
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APPENDIX P
QUESTIONNAIRE
Based on the defendant's social history, crime description, 
current behavior, and test scores, please answer the 
following questions:
1. Given the information provided, how heinous do you feel 
the defendant's crime was?
Not at alJ Extremely
heinous heinous
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Given the information provided, how impulsive was the
defendant's behavior during the commission of the crime? 
Not at all Extremely
impulsive impulsive
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Given the information provided, how much impact did the
defendant's clinical condition have on Lae commission 
of the crime?
No impact Extreme impact
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Not legally Legally
responsible responsible
4. Given the information provided, what is your assessment
of the defendant's legal responsibility for his actions
during the commission of the crime?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Given the information provided, how likely is it that
the defendant's current behavior on death-row is
malingering?
Not at all likely Very likely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Based ou the information presented, do you believe the
defendant is competent, in a legal sense, to be 
executed (i.e., is he aware of his impending execution 
and the reasons for it)? Yes ____ No ____
7. Using numbers from the Likert format below, please 
indicate how important the following factors were m  
determining your decision regarding the defendant's 
competency Lo be executed:
Not at all important Very important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
____ Current Behavior on Death Row ____ Social history
____ Crime Description ____ Test Scores (MMPI, WAIS-R)
8. How many times in the last 5 years have you, in your
capacity as a psychologist, testified in court regarding 
the legal competency of a defendant? _______  times.
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9. Have you ever been involved in the assessment of 
competency for execution?
Yes ___  No ____
If yes, how many t i m e s " ________ times
10. Please indicate your attitude regarding the death
penalty:
Strongly in favor..........1
Somewhat in favor..........2
Somewhat in favor..........3
Strongly opposed...........A
11. Is your attitude toward the death penalty such that, as
a juror, you would be:
Unwilling to vote to impose it in any case.......  1
Willing to consider voting to impose it in
some cases.........................................  2
YOUR TIME AND CONSIDERATION IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
IS GREATLY APPRECIATED. PLEASE RETURN ALL THREE PAGES OF 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND YOUR CONSENT FORM IN THE ENCLOSED 
SELF-ADDRESSED, STAMPED ENVELOPE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH!
STATES (AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA) WITH AND 
WITHOUT THE DEATH PENALTY
Alabama.............................    Yes
Arizona..............................................  Yes
Arkansas.............................................  Yes
California...........................................  Yes
Colorado.............................................  Yes
Connecticut..........................................  Yes
Delaware............    Yes
Florida..............................................  Yes
Georgia..............................................  Yes
Idaho................................................  Yes
Illinois.............................................  Yes
Indiana..............................................  Yes
Kentucky.............................................  Yes
Louisiana.............................. .............  Yes
Maryland.... ........................................  Yes
Mississippi....................................    Yes
Missouri........     Yes
Montana. .............................................. Yes
Nebraska. ............................................. Yes
Nevada...............................................  Yes
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New Hampshire...........................................  Yes
New Jersey..............................................  Yes
New Mexico..............................................  Yes
North Carolina......................   Yes
Ohio..................................................... Yes
Oklahoma................................................  Yes
Oregon. . . ...........................................   Yes
Pennsylvania...........    Yes
South Carolina..........................................  Yes
South Dakota............................................  Yes
Tennessee...............................................  Yes
Texas...................................................  Yes
Utah....................................................  Yes
Virginia................................................  Yes
Washington..............................................  Yes
Wyoming.................................................  Yes
Alaska..................................................  No
District of Columbia.................................... No
Hawaii..................................................  No
Iowa.........    No
Kansas..................................................  No
Maine.................................................... No
Massachusetts...........................................  No
Michigan............    No
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Minnesota.......................   No
New York.................................................  No
North Dakota. . ...........................................  No
Rhode Island.............................................  No
Vermont..................................................  No
West Virginia............................................  No
Wisconsin. ..............................   No
APPENDIX R
REMINDER LETTER
11-23-90
MEMO:
This is just a reminder regarding the dissertation 
questionnaires sent concerning competency for execution. 
Your participation is very much appreciated, but strictly 
voluntary. Your contribution would provide valuable data. 
If possible, please respond.
Thank you for your time. 
Sincerely,
Sharon R. Brown, M.A.
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